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ABSTRACT 
 
CONSTRAINING LABOR'S “DOUBLE FREEDOM”:  REVISITING THE IMPACT 
OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LAWS ON LABOR MARKETS, 1979-2014 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
 
ERIC S. HOYT, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON  
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Directed by: Fidan A. Kurtulus 
I study the impact of wrongful discharge laws, a form of employment protection in the 
U.S., on union membership, wages, job tenure, and on-the-job training.  There are several 
important contributions of this work to the previous social science research on the topic:  
First, I update the legal adoption dataset to 2014.  Second, this is the first examination to 
date of the link between wrongful discharge laws and unions.  Third, this is the first 
analysis that is able to include firm size controls in the investigation of the impact of 
wrongful discharge laws on wages.  Finally, this analysis is the first to investigate the 
impact of wrongful discharge laws on the marginal distribution of wages, poverty status, 
job tenure, and training, and to investigate the impact across race and ethnicity.  I find 
that one wrongful discharge law, the implied contract doctrine, increases union 
membership rates for all private-sector workers, across manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing industries, and particularly for younger men and women.  I find that 
two laws, the implied contract doctrine and the good faith doctrine, increase wages for 
low-wage workers, especially women, minorities, and manufacturing workers.  Also, I 
find that the good faith doctrine raises workers’ tenure, and increases the probability that 
 vii 
workers, particularly minorities and those within nonmanufacturing, participate in 
comprehensive on-the-job training.  My results demonstrate that employment protection 
can promote union membership, wages, and stable and skilled employment, especially for 
younger workers, women, and minorities, all of whom have been hard hit by recent 
economic changes.  Employment protection can serve as a valuable tool in fostering 
growth and fairness in the labor market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Capitalism, our current economic system, emerged in the late sixteenth century in 
England before spreading throughout the globe.  It drastically increased the productivity 
of nations, allowing a rapid increase in average income per capita. Capitalism also fueled 
tremendous growth in inequality between the owners of the emerging industries and 
individuals compelled to work within them.  This process entailed the uprooting of 
centuries old traditions of property relations and production, as small peasant proprietors 
were suddenly kicked off of their land and feudal trades were transformed or replaced by 
competition with early capitalist manufacturing.  From the vantage point of the mid-
nineteenth century, the critic and philosopher Karl Marx highlighted an important aspect 
of this broad social change: 
For conversion of his money into capital, therefore, the owner of money must 
meet in the market with the free labourer, free in the double sense, that as a free 
man he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the 
other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary 
for the realization of his labour-power (Capital vol.1 pp.166). 
 
Marx explains the labor process as based on the fact that employers have considerable 
economic and social power because of their ownership of nearly all productive capital.  
Meanwhile workers experience incredible insecurity because they lack any resources 
aside from their ability to work.  Workers also faced extreme competition for jobs given 
the abundant supply of cheap industrial labor newly arrived from the countryside.  In the 
United States, this relationship was codified in the years following the Civil War when 
employers promulgated the legal invention of employment-at-will, the doctrine that 
workers can be fired for any reason or no reason at all (Wood 1886). 
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Just cause, a contrasting legal rule, contends that workers should only be fired for 
specified reasons, such as misconduct, incompetence, or unfavorable economic 
conditions.  Just cause was an important demand of the trade union movement that 
emerged to counter exploitative working conditions within capitalist industry.  By the 
middle of the twentieth century, union membership in the United States peaked at about 
one quarter of all workers, extending just cause protection through collective bargaining 
agreements to a significant layer of the workforce.  Traditional labor relations in the 
United States began to unravel following increased global competition and economic 
crises in the 1970s.  A steady downward trend in union membership since the 1950s 
accelerated starting in the late 1970s, resulting in tremendous decline of union 
membership.  By 1995, private-sector union membership accounted for 14.9 percent, and 
by 2014 11.1 percent, of all workers.  Unions, in no small part because they restrict 
employers’ ability to fire workers, are a significant bulwark against the tendency towards 
exploitative working conditions.  An important result of the decline of unions over this 
period was an immediate growth in income inequality (Gosling and Lemieux 2004). For 
instance, in the United States, the share of all income going to the top 1% of the income 
distribution was 12% at the middle of the twentieth century, but rose to 21.8% by 2005 
(MacEwan 2011).   
Wrongful discharge laws, court-based protections against arbitrary dismissal in 
the United States, were adopted from the 1970s through 1990s in part in response to the 
deterioration in employment protection caused by union decline.  While much weaker 
than the job protections within collective bargaining agreements, these policies 
nonetheless cover all private-sector workers.  Wrongful discharge laws take three forms.  
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The implied contract doctrine converts statements made orally or within written 
employment manuals into legally-binding job protection.  The public policy doctrine 
gives workers protection from dismissal that contravenes state laws or general public 
welfare.  The good faith doctrine prevents employers from dismissing workers for 
morally reprehensible or malicious reasons.  My dissertation research investigates the 
impact of these policies on union density in Chapter 1, wages in Chapter 2, and tenure 
and on-the-job training in Chapter 3.  In Chapter 1, I find that the implied contract 
doctrine raises union density, particularly within manufacturing industry and for younger 
men and women.  In Chapter 2, I discover that the good faith doctrine increases wages 
across industries and demographic groups, and that the implied contract doctrine raises 
wages for younger manufacturing workers.  In Chapter 3, I find that the good faith 
doctrine increases job tenure and the probability that workers participate in 
comprehensive on-the-job training. 
My finding in Chapter 1 that the implied contract doctrine raises union density 
within manufacturing might help explain my result in Chapter 2 of increases in wages 
within manufacturing, since unions boost wages.  Previous research demonstrates that 
firms avoid the costs of the implied contract doctrine by replacing full-time workers with 
temporary workers (Autor 2003), which may help explain my finding of job tenure 
declines following implied contract adoption across nearly all industries and demographic 
groups in Chapter 3. On the other hand, I find no impact of the implied contract doctrine 
on manufacturing job tenure, except for a marginally significant increase for the most 
senior workers.  This result suggests that the increase in manufacturing union density 
associated with adoption of the implied contract doctrine may partially restrict firms’ 
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ability to adjust along the employment margin.  One might expect such stringent controls 
on free labor markets to impact productivity.  However, Autor et. al. (2007)’s 
investigation of the impact of wrongful discharge laws on productivity, using data from 
manufacturing industry establishments, found no impact of the implied contract doctrine 
on either total factor productivity or labor productivity. 
While I find no effect of the good faith doctrine on union density in Chapter 1, I 
find strong evidence that the good faith doctrine increases wages, job tenure, and 
participation within comprehensive on-the-job training in Chapters 2 and 3.  These results 
match nicely Autor et. al. (2007)’s finding that the good faith doctrine increases labor 
productivity.  Either the standard theory of labor demand, viewing wages as equivalent to 
workers’ marginal productivity of labor, or theories of noncompetitive labor markets that 
suggest employment protection might boost productivity through raising worker morale, 
are sufficient to link my findings of tenure and training increases with my finding of 
wage increases associated with good faith doctrine adoption.   
Much of the rise in inequality since the late 1970s stems from wage stagnation 
coupled with a doubling of productivity.  CEOs and major shareholders have pocketed as 
income a significant share of the added revenue from rising output. Even more ominous, 
since the Great Recession inequality has continued to grow while productivity has itself 
stagnated in important sectors such as manufacturing.  Tenure and job training have also 
continued to deteriorate, with nearly all new employment created since the Great 
Recession being temporary and precarious (Katz and Krueger 2016).  Employment 
protection policies like the implied contract and good faith doctrines can help counteract 
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rising inequality and stagnating productivity by fostering union membership, wage 
growth, job stability, and opportunities to develop on-the-job knowledge and skills. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LAWS ON UNION DENSITY:  
1983-2014 
 
 
Abstract:    Union membership has declined in recent decades following the rise of harsh 
union avoidance tactics.  This paper utilizes variation in the year and state of adoption of 
wrongful-discharge court doctrines in the U.S. over the 1980s and 1990s as natural 
experiments regarding the impact of employment protection on union membership.    I 
find that adoption of one wrongful discharge law in particular, the implied contract 
doctrine, is associated with small but consistent increases in union membership rates for 
all private-sector workers by 0.83 percentage points, in manufacturing by 1.35 percentage 
points, for nonmanufacturing by 0.52 percentage points, and for younger male workers 
by 1.38 percentage points.  I find significant increases in union membership levels in 
manufacturing by 7.90 percent and for younger male workers by 9.53 percent. These 
results suggest that the implied contract doctrine boosts union density by lowering the 
cost of seeking union membership.  Employment protection policies may serve as a 
counterweight to the pressures undermining union density over this period. 
 
 
Keywords: labor unions, union density, wrongful discharge laws, employment protection  
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Introduction 
 
In the United States, wrongful-discharge common law doctrines have been growing in 
importance as state courts have followed a trend of precedent-setting employment law 
rulings.  These decisions, though occurring with significant variation between states in 
timing of adoption and broadness of applicability, have nonetheless altered the basic 
institutional foundation underlying the U.S. labor market since the late 19th century, the 
common-law doctrine of employment-at-will.  Employment-at-will allows employers to 
dismiss their employees for any reason or no reason at all.   
A vibrant economic literature has arisen in recent decades concerning the impact of 
wrongful discharge laws on wages, job flows, hiring rates, employment, productivity, and 
the use of temporary workers.  A contemporaneous literature has emerged within the 
labor movement seeking to understand the dramatic fall in unions’ membership and 
economic influence in the U.S. economy which began following WWII and accelerated 
in the late 1970s.  This work is the first to investigate the impact of wrongful-discharge 
laws on union membership and coverage outcomes, adding a previously unexamined 
dimension to the literature on wrongful discharge laws, while contributing a rigorous 
analysis of the role played by employment law changes in mediating union decline. 
My analysis shows adoption of one wrongful discharge law in particular, the implied 
contract doctrine, is associated with modest but consistent increases in union membership 
and coverage density.  Union membership and coverage rates increase in the entire 
private sector (0.83 and 1.01 percentage points), in manufacturing industry (1.35 and 1.62 
percentage points), in nonmanufacturing industry (0.52 and 0.71), for younger male 
workers (1.38 and 1.47 percentage points), and for younger female workers (0.52 and 
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0.77 percentage points).  These results appear driven by significant increases in union 
membership and coverage levels within manufacturing industry (7.09% and 9.07%), and 
for younger male workers (9.53% and 9.62%).   
The literature on the labor market effects of wrongful discharge laws, founded on the 
theoretical model articulated by Lazear (1990) and Blanchard and Katz (1997), predicts 
employment protection policies, by increasing firing costs, have an indeterminate effect 
on employment levels.  Employment protection slows the rate of dismissal and the rate of 
hiring by complicating firm discharge decisions.  The theory predicts in the short-run that 
employment levels may increase, decrease, or be unaffected, depending on the particular 
labor demand conditions in the economy.  In the long run, theory predicts employment 
levels and wages may fall if productivity gains fail to offset rising labor costs.   
I employ difference in differences methodology using variation in the state and year 
of adoption of wrongful-discharge court doctrines over the 1980s and 1990s as numerous 
natural experiments.   Autor et. al. (2006), with monthly outcome variables for 
employment, wages, and explanatory variables for policy adoptions, find that adoption of 
one wrongful discharge law, the implied contract doctrine, has moderate and consistent 
negative effects on employment and no significant effect on wages.  Further, the authors 
find the effect of the implied contract doctrine is felt strongest in the short-term by 
workers most likely to switch jobs often, such as women and less educated workers.  The 
authors find that the long-run impact is felt strongest by older and more educated 
workers.  They also find stronger negative impacts of the implied contract doctrine on 
manufacturing as opposed to nonmanufacturing employment.   
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Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) reveal disemployment results consistent with an 
explanation based on asymmetric information and employee-employer matching.  The 
authors find evidence that wrongful discharge doctrines motivate a process of adverse 
selection in which employers discriminate in hiring against the unemployed.  The authors 
argue that employers, since they have imperfect information about employees, assume 
the already unemployed are often “lemons”, bad investments from the perspective of the 
firm, because their employment status reflects non-observable qualities such as a lack of 
motivation.  The authors predict that, after firing costs rise following the adoption of 
wrongful-discharge laws, employers increase their employment discrimination against 
unemployed workers.  The authors find that this effect is lessened for union members, 
whose unemployment is mediated by seniority and less likely to reflect unobservable 
worker characteristics.  Kugler’s results are similar to Autor et. al. (2006) in pointing 
towards stronger disemployment effects for precarious labor market participants.  Autor 
(2003) notes that states with slower union decline also witnessed greater utilization of 
temporary workers reflecting employers’ avoidance of union wage premia.  My paper 
contributes the incite that slower union decline may itself reflect adoption of wrongful 
discharge laws. 
Retaliatory firing of union activists plays a significant role in the large decline in 
union membership and coverage since the late 1970s1.  The findings in this paper suggest 
that employment protection policies might counteract retaliatory discharge during union 
organizing by making all discharge costlier for employers.  Wrongful discharge laws can 
                                                 
1 Researchers have found that since the 1980s nearly 1-in-4 union elections is marred by retaliatory 
discharge, and pro-union workers face a 2%-3% chance of suffering retaliatory discharge (Schmitt and 
Zipperer 2007, LaLonde and Meltzer 1991, and Weiler 1983).  Even following successful union 
representation elections, research shows that only 48% of organized workplaces have a collective 
bargaining agreement one year following the election (Bronfenbrenner 2009). 
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serve as a counterweight to the pressures undermining union membership, especially in 
the manufacturing industry which experienced some of the largest declines in union 
membership and coverage over this period.  Since younger men and women were 
historically underrepresented within unions, my findings suggest that employment 
protection may also help to grow union membership beyond its traditional base.   
 For instance, the first case adopting the implied contract doctrine in Hawaii, 
Kinoshita v. Canadian Pacific Airlines (1986), provides striking evidence of the role of 
wrongful discharge laws in union organizing.   Canadian Pacific Airlines distributed new 
employee handbooks containing just cause provisions to its nonunion U.S. baggage 
handlers, passenger attendants, and clerical employees during two union representation 
elections to dissuade workers from organizing.  While the airline may have enacted this 
employment protection policy as means of union avoidance, they were likely insincere in 
their commitment since they argued in this case that the two part-time passenger 
attendants were employed at-will despite statements to the contrary in the company’s 
employee handbook.  The court ruled in favor of the workers.  Although Canadian Pacific 
Airlines, now under the name and ownership of Air Canada, may have hoped its policy 
would circumvent workers’ bargaining power, their customer service and ramp agents 
eventually joined the Teamsters Airline Division union2.  In other words, wrongful 
discharge laws can promote union membership by moderating a major cost of seeking 
union membership, retaliatory discharge of union activists. 
 The case signaling adoption of the implied contract doctrine in Tennessee, Hamby 
v. Genesco (1981), provides a broader illustration of the ways workers can make use of 
                                                 
2 For instance, Teamsters Airline Division’s current collective bargaining agreement with Air Canada runs 
from March 2015 through June 2019. See http://teamsterair.org/node/2300 
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wrongful discharge laws in workplace organizing.  Hamby and other shoe manufacturing 
production workers in Cowan, Tennessee faced a gradual “run down” in their plant in 
1978, following rising global competition and a recession.  Workers were laid off as their 
particular role in the production of the last orders of shoes was completed.  The employee 
handbook had promised that, in the event of a gradual shut down, more senior workers 
would be permitted to substitute for less senior workers in every step of the two-week 
long process of producing the last batch of shoes.  This method of closure would 
guarantee advanced warning and de facto severance pay for workers based on their level 
of seniority.  When Genesco sidestepped this procedure, several workers including 
Hamby sued for wrongful discharge on the grounds that the employee handbook 
constituted an implied contract.  Their case came to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which 
decided in favor of the workers that Genesco’s handbook constituted an implied contract.  
In this instance, the implied contract doctrine promoted workers general organization at 
the workplace, while also spurring action on the broad issue of employers’ 
responsibilities during plant closures.  Successful collective action demonstrates the 
benefits of workplace organization.  Thus, wrongful discharge laws can boost demand for 
union membership by raising the likelihood that workers in states adopting these policies 
will prevail in diverse efforts to improve compensation and working conditions. 
Institutional Background of Wrongful Discharge Laws 
Before proceeding further, I will comment on the institutional background of 
wrongful-discharge doctrines.  Three primary wrongful-discharge doctrines proliferated 
in recent decades:  the implied contract doctrine, the public policy doctrine, and the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   
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The implied contract doctrine states that language in employee manuals and oral 
promises made by supervisors detailing a specific duration of employment or standard 
procedures for dismissal can override the default of employment-at-will.  In some states, 
the implied contract doctrine arises in the absence of written or oral promises when 
employers’ actions establish a repeated past practice of discharging only for justified 
reasons (Hirsch, Secunda, and Bales 2013).  Toussaint v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Michigan (1980) is frequently cited as one of the early cases that best articulates the 
implied contract doctrine.  Charles Toussaint worked for many years for his employer 
Blue Cross Blue Shield. When he started the position, he was told that his employment 
was secure as long as he performed his job well.  After he was fired without an 
explanation, Toussaint sued for wrongful discharge.  The Michigan Supreme Court ruled 
that his employer’s statements, as well as language in the company’s employee 
handbook, constituted legally enforceable guarantees of dismissal for “good cause” 
(Muhl 2001).  The implied contract doctrine developed as the wrongful discharge law 
with the broadest practical application, covering every discharge within a workplace with 
a “good cause” standard rather than prohibiting particular “bad faith” discharges.  The 
damages awarded to litigants are contractual, meaning employers pay workers’ lost 
earnings, less any amount of pay attained in new employment.  In many states, courts 
weakened this policy by sanctioning employers’ use of disclaimers in employee 
handbooks.  Handbook disclaimers nullify implied contractual obligations by 
pronouncing to employees their at-will status. 
The public policy doctrine is an exception to the at-will rule arising when an 
employee is discharged after invoking a protected public right or obligation, such as 
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filing a worker’s compensation claim or attending jury duty.  The doctrine also relates to 
instances where an employee is fired for refusing their employer’s request to violate the 
public trust, ranging from a clear infraction like investment fraud to broader sanctions 
like endangering public health (Hirsch, Secunda, and Bales 2013).  The first case to 
illustrate the public policy doctrine was decided in August of 1959 in California. An 
employee of the Teamsters labor union was terminated after having provided truthful 
testimony to a state governmental body on internal corruption within the union, violating 
instructions given by his employer to deny such accusations under oath.  The court ruled 
in his favor when he challenged the dismissal, establishing a general principle developed 
subsequently in court rulings (Muhl 2001).  The doctrine permits tort damage awards for 
successful litigants.  Thus, the per litigant costs to employers of tort damages is larger 
than the contractual damages of the implied contract doctrine, including punitive 
damages and legal fees in addition to the employees’ lost earnings. Tort damages are 
meant as an additional disincentive to employers since the harm inflicted is both to the 
individual discharged employee as well as to the broader community.  However, cases 
involving the public policy doctrine are less common than cases arising under the implied 
contract doctrine, given they pertain only to particular instances of discharge for “bad 
cause”.  The overall cost to employers of the public policy doctrine is likely less than that 
of the implied contract doctrine. 
Finally, the good faith doctrine, if followed to the letter, requires that every discharge 
decision be justified.  However, over time the good faith doctrine has developed, like the 
public policy doctrine, only to prohibit particular cases of morally reprehensible 
termination.  For instance, one of the first adoptions of the good faith doctrine was the 
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Massachusetts case Fortune vs. National Cash Register Co. (1977).   Fortune was a sales 
employee discharged just after finalizing a deal entitling him to a substantial commission.  
He was rehired shortly afterwards.  The company structured its commission payouts to 
accrue to sales personnel in two installments:  when a deal was first signed with a 
customer, and then upon final delivery of the goods.  Since Fortune was discharged after 
the deal was signed but before the delivery of goods, he was left with less of the 
commission owed to him.  He sued for wrongful termination.  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court affirmed he was discharged in bad faith, and awarded him damages.  
Cases involving the good faith doctrine are somewhat rare since they prohibit specific 
instances of “bad cause” discharge.  While tort damages were permitted in most initial 
interpretations of the doctrine, the policy has developed in practice to limit litigant 
awards to contract damages in most adopting states.  Since cases involving the good faith 
doctrine are less common than the implied contract doctrine despite entailing the same 
per litigant costs to employers, this doctrine likely entails the smallest overall cost to 
employers (Hirsch, Secunda, and Bales 2013).  However, this policy is difficult to 
outmaneuver, as in the case of handbook disclaimers to the implied contract doctrine.  
The good faith doctrine was adopted most sporadically over year and regions of the U.S. 
compared to the other two laws, so its costs may impact employers strongly given 
difficulty anticipating adoption. 
Data Sources 
 
 This paper uses state court decisions from 1970 through 2014 to construct 
explanatory variables on wrongful discharge doctrine adoptions.  I employ the method of 
Morris (1995) by coding the first state supreme or state intermediate appellate court 
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ruling that demonstrates a clear acceptance of each of the three wrongful discharge 
doctrines.3  As illustrated by Figure A1, wrongful discharge cases, falling under civil law, 
first emerge at the level of trial courts.  Regardless of the outcome, either party may 
appeal the decision to the intermediate appellate court.  Either party may appeal the 
ruling of the intermediate appellate court, sending the case to the state supreme court, 
whose decision is final and binding for all lower courts in the state.  Following Morris, if 
an appellate court rules in favor of workers’ claim of wrongful discharge and neither 
party appeals this ruling then I code a state as having adopted this policy.  If, what is 
more common, either party appeals an intermediate court ruling such that the issue is 
ultimately first decided by the state supreme court, than this ruling is coded as the first 
state recognition of the particular wrongful discharge law. 
Endogeneity of these legal adoption explanatory variables is a major focus of 
wrongful discharge law literature.  Miles (2000), using duration analysis, finds 
statistically insignificant results ruling out many factors which could reasonably be 
expected to introduce omitted variable bias:  the extent of unionization in a state, the 
fraction of a state population that is black, or whether judges are elected directly (i.e. 22 
states choose justices by election only versus 28 in which justices are chosen to at least 
                                                 
3 While I first drew solely upon the legal adoption data for 1970 through 1999 constructed by Autor et. al. 
(2006) that are publicly accessible on David Autor’s MIT faculty website, 
http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor/data/autdonschw06, and that I first accessed on November 14, 
2012, I reassessed and updated the legal adoptions data set to 2014 based on my own analysis of the case 
law.   My analysis conforms to Morris (1995), but differs from Autor  et. al. (2006), in counting the implied 
contract doctrine as being adopted without subsequent repeal in Arizona from 1983 onwards.  My coding 
differs from Autor et. al. (2006) in not coding Louisiana as having adopted the good faith doctrine in 1998.  
Autor et. al.  (2006) appear to have misclassified Barbe v. A.A. Harmon & Co. (1998) as an adoption of a 
good faith exception to employment-at-will when the text of the case decision shows that it only created a 
good faith covenant in the provision of employee bonuses.  Finally, my reading of the case law and 
secondary literature made clear that the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in its Centronics v. Genicom 
(1989) decision, readopted the good faith doctrine.  This finding contradicts Morris (1995) and Autor et. al. 
(2006) as they seem to have both missed this development in their legal coding. 
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some extent by political appointment).  Miles finds one factor especially significant in 
predicting state adoption of wrongful discharge laws:  the fraction of neighboring states 
adopting these policies. This result motivates my use of region by year indicators in all 
regressions in my analysis, so that my union membership results reflect the impact of 
within region variation in the timing and extent of wrongful discharge law adoption.   
While the number of neighboring states may help determine the long-run likelihood a 
state adopts a wrongful discharge law, I concentrate on five-year windows surrounding 
adoption so as to isolate discontinuous changes in union membership following policy 
adoption.  Within the same region over the short five-year time window, the exact timing 
and extent of new wrongful discharge law adoption is effected less by the number of 
neighboring states with wrongful discharge laws, since each state faces a similar level of 
policy adherence among its neighbors.  
In order to match union membership and coverage data available at the yearly level 
for all states from 1983 onwards, I construct annual policy adoption variables for 1983 
until 2014.   The data set over this period includes the sustained (i.e. at least five-year 
long) adoption of the implied contract doctrine by 32 states, the public policy doctrine by 
26 states, and the good faith doctrine by 7 states.  Table A1 includes a complete list of all 
state wrongful discharge doctrine adoptions and repeals as of 20144.  Maps 1 through 3 of 
                                                 
4 In order to approximate the detail of Autor et. al. (2006) and Morris (1995)’s data regarding month of 
policy, I lump adoptions into the calendar year of passage if occurring from January through June, and into 
the following calendar year for policy adoptions occurring during July through December.  For instance, 
the adoption by New Hampshire of the implied contract exception in September of 1988, because it fell in 
the second half of the calendar year and was technically closer to January 1989 than January 1988, was 
classified as occurring in the year 1989.  As one sees, for instance in Appendix A of Autor et. al. (2006), 
the actual date of the court case decision in this case is in August of 1988 in New Hampshire, however I 
follow the method of Autor et. al. (2006) in classifying passage as taking effect in the first full month 
following the court decision, September 1988, for all adoptions when observed at the monthly-level of 
analysis.    
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Figure A2 give a geographic snapshot of state recognition of the three wrongful discharge 
doctrines as of 2014.  Table A1 shows the complete list of recognitions, adoptions, and 
repeals stretching back to 1960, long before the period of analysis in this paper.   They 
show a total of 43 sustained adoptions of the implied contract doctrine, 43 sustained 
adoptions of the public policy doctrine, and 12 sustained adoptions of the good faith 
doctrine as of 2014.  Only Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Rhode Island never adopted 
any wrongful discharge doctrines.  Also, no change has occurred in states’ recognition of 
wrongful discharge doctrines since the adoption of the good faith doctrine in Wyoming in 
January 1994. 
Yearly state-level union membership and coverage outcome variables for the years 
1983 to 2014 were constructed from the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing 
Rotation Group monthly files following the methodology of economists Barry Hirsh and 
David Macphearson (2003).  Monthly microdata data was extracted and then averaged, 
first over all private-sector workers aged 16 to 64 in each state for each month, and then 
over all months of the year in each state for all private-sector workers and for the subsets 
of private-sector union members and private-sector workers covered by collective 
bargaining agreements.  These figures were also constructed for the subsets of private-
sector manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers, and for private-sector workers 
within four sex-age demographic categories [i.e. (male vs. female) x (aged 16 to 39 vs. 
aged 40 to 64)].  This data was then used to construct yearly state union membership and 
coverage density figures for each state over the period 1983 to 2014, per the following 
formula:   
 % Memst = (Membersst/Employmentst)100   
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 % Covst = (Coveredst/Employmentst)100 
This study utilizes the union membership rate and union coverage rate, defined as the 
percentage of employed private-sector wage and salary employees who are union 
members and percentage who are covered by a union collective bargaining agreement, in 
order to provide a window into the impact of wrongful discharge laws on union’s social 
and economic influence.  The subscripts s and t on the union density measures indicate 
the relevant state and year of each observation.  While multiple attempts were made to 
extract and construct figures at the monthly-level, by more detailed private-sector 
industry subsamples, and by race and ethnicity, zero-valued union membership and 
coverage variables persisted for several states during multiple years over the period 1983 
to 2014.  In this paper, outcome variables for the levels of nonmembership and 
noncoverage are constructed by subtracting corresponding union membership and 
coverage levels from private-sector, industry, and demographic group employment.  
Econometric Models 
 
The treatment observations in the full fixed effects difference in differences 
regression analysis consist of the five years surrounding policy adoption, from two years 
before to two years after the year of policy change.  The control groups are composed of 
the states that did not adopt wrongful discharge laws over the five years surrounding 
adoption in a treatment state.  States adopting a wrongful discharge doctrine before the 
five-year period surrounding policy change in a treatment state enter the control group for 
that adoption.  The five-year treatment and control window is used instead of a panel 
composed over the entire sample period to account for possible serial correlation in 
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yearly state union membership and coverage outcome data, as well as to identify changes 
in the union outcome variables attributable to policy adoption. 
The full fixed effects difference in differences regression specification is: 
Yst =  αs + αs * Treatst + β1Postst + β2TreatstPostst + β3 Postpostst + δt x Regions+ δt + ԑst (1) 
 
Treatst  is an indicator for the five-year period from 2 years before to 2 years after the year 
of adoption of a wrongful-discharge law in treatment state s.  Postst is an indicator for the 
period from the year of adoption onwards for all states, both adopting and nonadopting.  
TreatstPostst  is an interaction term representing the three-year period following policy 
adoption in the treatment state5. The coefficient of interest β2 is an estimate of the pre-
post change in union outcomes in adopting states relative to the corresponding change in 
union outcomes in non-adopting states.  Postpostst  is a dummy variable that turns on for 
each state that reenters the control group 3 years after the year of policy adoption to 
account for any bias caused by enduring effects of policy adoption on union outcomes.6   
                                                 
5 This analysis does not retain the “doughnut hole” restriction of Autor et. al. (2006); that is, it does not 
omit data for the first twelve months immediately following policy adoption to account for a response 
period during which employers become aware and begin to react to the policy change.  My analysis is 
yearly so this restriction based on implementation delay over the first few months seemed inappropriate. 
 
6 To illustrate the legal doctrine adoption variables, consider the following example.  Massachusetts 
adopted the implied contract doctrine in 1988, while neighboring Rhode Island did not adopt any wrongful 
discharge law over the period studied.  Massachusetts is a treatment state, so the variable  Treatst takes on 
the value one for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990, and takes on the value of zero in years before 
1986 and after 1990.  Since Rhode Island did not adopt any wrongful discharge law over the five years 
surrounding adoption of the implied contract doctrine in Massachusetts, Treatst always remains zero in this 
state.  In this case, Rhode Island is included within the control group.  The variable Postst takes on the value 
one in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and in all other states, for all years that this policy remains in effect in 
Massachusetts, beginning with the year of adoption, which in this case is from the year 1988 to the end of 
the dataset in 2014.  Treatst* Postst is an interaction term representing the three-year period, in the treatment 
state only (i.e. Massachusetts), beginning with the year of adoption of the implied contract doctrine in 
1988.   In other words, Treatst* Postst takes on the value one only in Massachusetts and only for the years 
1988, 1989, and 1990.  Maine, another neighboring state, also did not adopt any wrongful discharge laws 
over the five years surrounding 1988, so it is included within the control group.  However, Maine adopted 
the implied contract doctrine in 1978.  In this case, the variable Postpostst switches from zero to one for 
Maine starting the year after the treatment window for its adoption ended, which is 1981, and takes on the 
value one for the rest of sample period, that is, until 2014.  Since Massachusetts becomes eligible as a 
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Yst, the outcome variable, represents the rate of union membership, rate of union 
coverage, level of union membership, level of union coverage, nonmembership level, or 
noncoverage level under analysis in each regression.  The variable αs is a state intercept 
that captures idiosyncratic, unobserved, and pre-existing features of each relevant state 
impacting union outcomes irrespective of the year of observation.  δt  represents year 
fixed effects controlling for yearly state-invariant shifts in the regression intercept, 
accounting for common national shocks to union outcomes.  δt x Regions is a term 
composed of fixed effects representing the four U.S. Census regions interacted with the 
year fixed effects in order to control for passing regional shocks to union membership 
and coverage outcomes.  
The term αs * Treatst is a state-time specific intercept accounting for changes in union 
outcome variables attributable to idiosyncratic, unobserved, and pre-existing features of 
the relevant treatment state over the five-year window surrounding policy adoption in that 
state.  Each regression is weighted by the share of national population aged 16 to 64 in 
each state in the given year, and Huber-White robust standard errors are used to account 
for within-state error correlations. Identification of β2 comes from variation in union 
membership and coverage outcomes between adopting and nonadopting states within the 
same census regions.  This specification gives an estimate of the causal effect of policy 
adoption controlling for a variety of state, regional, national, and yearly characteristics 
influencing union membership and coverage outcomes.     
                                                                                                                                                 
control for a later state adoption, its Postpostst variable, which switches on beginning in 1991, would take 
on the same role as it plays in Maine in this example.  The illustration described here is summarized in 
Table A2.  One important consequence of this five-year treatment window structure for the fixed effect 
specification is that it omits analysis of policy adoptions which occurred in 1983 and 1984. 
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As a robustness check on the results using the standard fixed effects model in 
equation 1, in which the state and year effects, αs  and δt, enter the specification 
additively, I employ in equation 2, listed below, a specification which is identical to 
equation 1 aside from including interactive state and year fixed effects.  The specification 
is: 
Yst = αs * Treatst + β1Postst + β2TreatstPostst + β3 Postpostst + δt x Regions+ λsFt + ԑst (2) 
 
where the interactive state and year fixed effects λsFt , as first elaborated in Bai (2009), 
capture unobservable shocks to union membership and coverage outcomes with common 
or heterogeneous impacts across the sample.  This model subsumes the additive effects αs 
and δt. For instance, if, as assumed in equation 1, a common national shock (i.e. 
technological development) has a homogenous effect on union membership and coverage 
outcomes, then λs = λ for all states s and the interactive fixed effect term collapses to the 
additive time effect δt = λFt.   
Finally, as a check on the assumptions underlying a causal relationship (i.e. time 
order and parallel trends), I employ a differences-in-differences regression with yearly 
leads and lags from two years before to two years after the year of adoption.  The model 
is: 
Yst = αs  + δt +  ∑  2𝜏=−2 γτ Ls,t-τ + λsFt + δt x Regions+ ԑst    (3) 
The variables Yst, αs,   δt , λsFt, and δt x Regions  are defined identically as in equations 1 
and 2.   The dummy variable Ls,t  switches on from zero to one only during the year a 
state court adopts a wrongful discharge doctrine, and permits the estimation of the impact 
over the first year following adoption of each doctrine on union outcomes in adopting 
states relative to nonadopting states.  The parameter of interest γτ gives the first-year 
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impact of the adoption of wrongful discharge laws on union membership and coverage 
outcomes between adopting and nonadopting states.  The specification is weighted by the 
share of national population aged 16 to 64 in each state in the given year, and uses Huber-
White robust standard errors.  Identification of γτ comes from within-region first-year 
variation in union membership and coverage outcomes between adopting and 
nonadopting states.  I focus analysis using equation 3 on manufacturing workers, since 
this subsample experienced the largest and most significant impact of wrongful discharge 
laws.  In order to match the previous analysis, the overall sample window of adoptions 
analyzed was restricted to 1985 to 2011.   
Results 
A. Fixed Effects Difference in Differences Regression 
The fixed effect difference-in-difference regression specification from equation 1 
reveals7 that, in the case of the implied contract doctrine, policy adoption is associated 
with increases in private-sector union membership and coverage rates of 0.83 and 1.01 
percentage points, as seen in column 1 of the first rows of Panels A and D of Table A3.  
The increase in private-sector union coverage rate appears largely driven by a respective 
marginally significant increase in the level of private-sector union coverage by 6.23%, 
visible in column 4 of the first row of Panel E of Table A3.  While private-sector union 
coverage levels experience a marginally significant 10.16% decline associated with 
adoption of the good faith doctrine, in column 4 of the last row of Panel E of Table A3, 
                                                 
7  Sample statistics tables containing the mean, standard deviation, and number of observations for all fixed 
effects regression samples of union outcome variables were constructed but omitted from this paper to save 
space.  They are available from this author upon request.  These tables are divided by subsamples for the 
implied contract, public policy, and good faith doctrine combined treatment and control samples.   The 
sample means for all outcome variables across all three doctrine regressions approximate the national 
average levels of union membership and coverage and union density over the years studied.   
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private-sector union coverage rates and private-sector union membership are not 
significantly impacted by good faith doctrine adoption.  This large decline could be at 
least in part related to the disproportionate declines in private-sector union membership 
and coverage levels in Arizona occurring alongside, but unrelated to, policy adoption.8 
Turning to industry-level analysis, the implied contract doctrine significantly 
increases private-sector manufacturing union membership and coverage rates by 1.35 and 
1.62 percentage points, respectively, in column 2 of the first row of Panels A and D of 
Table A3.  These results appear driven by large and consistent increases in private-sector 
manufacturing union membership and coverage levels of 7.90% and 9.07%, in column 5 
of the first row of Panels B and E of Table A3.  The implied contract doctrine increases 
private-sector nonmanufacturing union membership and coverage rates by 0.52 and 0.71 
percentage points, respectively, in column 3 of the first row of Panels A and D of Table 
A3.  The level of private-sector nonmanufacturing union membership and coverage 
shows positive, but insignificant, change. 
The good faith doctrine is associated with a sizeable decline in private-sector 
manufacturing union membership and coverage rates of 1.62 and 1.79 percentage points, 
respectively, in column 2 of the third row of Panels A and B of Table A3, driven by 
sizeable and significant declines of 14.1% and 10.8% in private-sector manufacturing 
union membership and coverage levels, in column 5 of the third row of Panels B and E of 
Table A3.  These sizeable declines in private-sector manufacturing union membership 
                                                 
8 Arizona saw a 30% decline in private-sector union membership and coverage levels over the five-year 
period surrounding good faith doctrine adoption in 1985.  One reason for this exceptional decline could be 
the historic three-year long strike, from 1983 to 1986, of Arizona copper mine and mill workers of Phelps-
Dodge Company resulting in the replacement of nearly all striking workers and the decertification of their 
union.  In fact, this particular union decertification remains the largest in U.S. labor history (Kingsolver 
1989).    
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and coverage levels, as in the case of total private-sector union membership and coverage 
levels, might reflect the outsized impact of the mass dismissal and replacement of striking 
copper mine and mill union members in Arizona. 
The public policy doctrine has no effect on union outcomes.  Similarly, wrongful 
discharge laws have no significant impact on nonmembership or noncoverage levels as 
shown in Panels C and F of Table A3.  
Analysis of the four sex-age demographic groups in Table A4 suggests that the 
implied contract doctrine is associated with a 1.38 and 1.47 percentage point significant 
increase in union membership and coverage rates for younger male private-sector 
workers, as shown in the columns 1 and 5 of the first row of Panels A and B.  This 
growth appears driven by large and statistically significant 9.53% and 9.62% increases in 
the level of union membership and coverage for younger male workers, as seen in 
columns 1 and 5 of the first row of Panels C and D of Table A4.   In the case of younger 
female private-sector workers, union membership and coverage rates also increase by 
0.52 and 0.77 percentage points following adoption of the implied contract doctrine, as 
visible in columns 3 and 7 of the first row of panels A and B in Table A4.  However, 
younger female private-sector workers’ union membership and coverage levels increase 
by large but statistically insignificant magnitudes.   
Good faith doctrine adoption is associated with large and significant declines in union 
membership and coverage levels for younger female private-sector workers in columns 3 
and 7 of the third row of Panels C and D in Table A4.  While this result has no significant 
effect on younger female private-sector workers’ union density, and stands out against 
the large but insignificant declines in union membership and coverage levels for younger 
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male private-sector workers following good faith doctrine adoption, it may nonetheless 
reflect the outlier role played by union decline in Arizona during the 1983 to 1986 copper 
industry strike.  Interestingly, within the Arizona copper industry, and particularly within 
the Phelps-Dodge Company involved in the strike, women made up a significant 
component of the copper mill workforce9.  In this case, union membership and coverage 
declines may be strongest for women workers given their prevalence.  Also, among 
married coworkers facing massive strike-related discharge, male employment might have 
been prioritized, given the legacy of traditional gender roles. 
The public policy doctrine has no significant effect on union outcomes for the four 
sex-age demographic groups, aside from a marginally significant increase of 0.55 
percentage points in younger female private-sector worker union coverage rates, in 
column 7 of the second row of Panel B in Table A4.  Wrongful discharge laws have no 
impact on nonmembership or noncoverage levels, as shown in Panels E and F of Table 
A4, save for marginally significant declines in older female private-sector workers’ 
nonmembership and noncoverage levels of 3.09% and 3.47%, respectively, associated 
with the implied contract doctrine in column 8 of the first row of Panel F of Table A4.   
Interactive Fixed Effects Regressions 
Table A5 shows the results of regressions using equation 2, the interactive fixed 
effects model, which helps account for the fact that states which do and do not adopt 
wrongful discharge laws may have unobserved but substantial differences even in the 
absence of policy adoption.  This fact violates the assumption of parallel trends that the 
                                                 
9 By World War II, women made up one quarter of Phelps-Dodge copper mill workers in Arizona.  While 
many left the workforce as men returned from war, a significant portion remained employed over the post 
war decades.  In the 1970s, with government assistance, women made further inroads into mining 
employment in Arizona (Buckles 2017).   
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change over time in union membership and coverage outcomes in adopting and 
nonadopting states would be the same if policy adoption did not occur.  Interactive fixed 
effects control for these unobserved factors that vary across state and year, focusing the 
analysis upon changes in union membership and coverage outcomes associated with 
wrongful discharge law adoptions rather than changes caused by omitted unobservable 
confounding factors. 
For simplicity, I focus the interactive fixed effects analysis on union membership and 
coverage rates only, but evaluated across every subsample studied:  all private-sector 
workers, the subset of these workers in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries, 
and subsamples of younger and older male and female private-sector workers.  Table A5 
shows that the implied contract doctrine is associated with significant but modest 
increases in private-sector workers’ union membership and coverage rates of 0.65 and 
0.53 percentage points, driven by significant increases in private-sector manufacturing 
union membership and coverage rates of 1.45 and 1.47 percentage points, respectively.  
Table A5 reveals no significant impact of the implied contract doctrine on private-sector 
nonmanufacturing union membership rates, in contrast to estimates in Table A3, but 
continues to find a significant, if small, increase in union coverage rates for private-sector 
nonmanufacturing workers of 0.48 percentage points.  Perhaps most striking, the 
inclusion of interactive fixed effects largely eliminates any significant impact of the 
implied contract doctrine on younger male union density.  However, the impact of the 
implied contract doctrine upon younger female private-sector workers’ union 
membership and coverage rates grows to statistically significant increases 0.50 and 0.77 
percentage points.       
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Table A5 shows that, when using interactive fixed effects, the negative effect of good 
faith doctrine adoption on union membership and coverage rates in private-sector 
manufacturing grows compared to previous estimates to 3.47 and 4.6 percentage points, 
respectively.  These findings are large enough to drive, in contrast to the results in Table 
A3, large and significant declines in union membership and coverage rates for all private-
sector workers of 1.83 and 2.31 percentage points.  While the good faith doctrine 
continues to have insignificant effects on union density for younger female, older male, 
and older female private-sector workers, inclusion of interactive fixed effects reveals 
significant declines of 1.36 percentage points in younger male private-sector workers’ 
union membership and coverage rates.  These results provide further support to the 
hypothesis that strong declines in union membership and coverage outcomes following 
good faith doctrine adoption may be driven by exceptional declines in the copper milling 
industry in Arizona contemporaneous with policy adoption.  Even when nonadopting 
states are made to be more similar to Arizona and other good faith doctrine adopting 
states, the large decline in union density emerges powerfully in across the private-sector, 
especially in manufacturing, the location of massive union decertification in Arizona.  
 The public policy doctrine continues to have no significant impact on union 
membership and coverage rates, save for marginally significant increases in private-
sector nonmanufacturing union coverage rates of 0.45 percentage points and for younger 
female private-sector workers’ union coverage rates of 0.56 percentage points. 
Event Study Difference in Differences Regression 
Table A6 illustrates the dynamic effects, obtained using equation 3, of state 
adoption of wrongful discharge doctrines on private-sector manufacturing union 
 28 
membership rates from two years prior to two years after the year of policy adoption in 
adopting states relative to nonadopting states.  All yearly coefficients, γτ, are evaluated 
relative to year t-3, just prior to the first pre-period year.  The dynamic effects results in 
Table A6 show that private-sector manufacturing union membership rates remained fairly 
constant, with no significant or sizeable change in the years preceding policy adoption, 
and then grew by the second year following adoption to a marginally significant peak of 
1.49 percentage points relative to year t-3.  Consistent with the pattern of employment 
effects of the implied contract doctrine found in the literature on wrongful discharge 
laws, the impact dissipates by a few years after policy enactment, reflecting employers’ 
success in contracting around the law change (i.e. using handbook disclaimers).   
The public policy or good faith doctrines show no statistically significant dynamic 
effects, though the change from large positive effects in the years preceding good faith 
doctrine adoption to small negative effects in the years following adoption illustrate the 
basis for the sizeable and significant overall five-year effects for this policy found 
previously.  Figure A3 provides a graphical illustration of the same results for the implied 
contract doctrine shown in column 1 of Table A6.  The pattern of dynamic effects of 
implied contract doctrine adoption supports the assumptions of time order and parallel 
trends, given no significant impact on private-sector union membership prior to policy 
adoption, and significant growth in the second year following policy adoption. 
Conclusion 
The implied contract doctrine appears to increase union density, and this growth is 
concentrated in industries (i.e. manufacturing), and demographic groups (i.e. younger 
men and women) where unions have, respectively, an historic base and potential for 
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growth.  Younger workers, especially younger women, have been historically 
underrepresented within unions.  While having much to gain from union membership, 
women have often been too precariously employed to take the risks necessary to form or 
join unions.  Policies such as wrongful discharge laws that lower the costs of seeking 
union membership can embolden workers to build and grow unions.  
Past economic research has linked employment protection to slowed employment and 
job flows, small but consistent declines in employment, and increased use of temporary 
workers.  These new findings demonstrate that wrongful discharge laws may also 
promote union membership and collective bargaining.  At the very least, one could argue 
that these policies, passed during a period of steep union decline and deindustrialization 
in the United States, helped stem losses in union membership and coverage. Given 
current debates regarding persistent and growing inequality following the Great 
Recession, employment protection and unions could be mutually reinforcing tools in 
fostering growth and fairness in the economy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF ADOPTION OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LAWS ON 
WAGES:  1979-2014 
 
 
Abstract:    While economic theory offers predictions about the effect of employment 
protection on wages, the empirical literature has focused primarily on employment 
effects.  This paper uses individual-level panel data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979, cross-sectional data from Current Population Survey Merged 
Outgoing Rotation Group files, weighted ordinary least squares fixed effects and 
unconditional quantile difference in differences regressions to estimate the effect of 
wrongful discharge laws, a court-based form of employment protection in the United 
States, on real wages.  I find that one wrongful discharge law, the good faith doctrine, 
increases average real wages by 18.59 percent for all private-sector workers, 17.18 
percent for nonmanufacturing workers, 13.75 percent for men, 21.68 percent for women, 
21.04 percent for white workers, and 12.97 percent for nonwhite workers.  My results 
show that wrongful discharge laws, whether by increasing workers’ bargaining power or 
by increasing their labor productivity, can boost workers’ wages, particularly for workers 
hardest hit by recent economic changes such as women, minorities, and workers in 
nonmanufacturing industries.   
 
 
Keywords: wages, unconditional quantile regression, wrongful discharge laws, 
employment protection  
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Introduction 
 
Employers’ ability to fire workers has been a major focus in the literature 
studying different patterns of employment and growth in the United States and Europe.  
Wrongful discharge laws, a form of court-based employment protection in the United 
States, have been a special focus of this literature, as their adoption randomly across state 
and year from the 1970s through 1990s creates numerous natural experiments regarding 
the impact of employment protection on labor markets.  While much focus has been put 
on the effect of these increased firing costs on employment, less time has been spent 
investigating the impact on wages, even though theoretical literature on employment 
protection makes clear predictions about the impact of firing costs on wages.  
Three primary wrongful-discharge doctrines proliferated in recent decades:  the 
implied contract doctrine, the public policy doctrine, and the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.  The implied contract doctrine states that language in employee manuals and 
oral promises made by supervisors detailing a specific duration of employment or 
standard procedures for dismissal can override the default of employment-at-will.  The 
public policy doctrine is an exception to the at-will rule that arises when an employee is 
discharged after invoking a publicly protected right or obligation, such as filing a 
worker’s compensation claim or attending jury duty, or refusing an employer’s request to 
break the law.  The good faith doctrine, if followed to the letter, requires that every 
discharge decision be justified.  While in some states the policy maintains a broad 
meaning, in many others the good faith doctrine was revised to, like the public policy 
doctrine, only to prohibit particular cases of morally reprehensible termination.  While 
the implied contract and public policy doctrines were adopted by 43 states, the good faith 
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doctrine was adopted by only 12 states.  The earliest wrongful discharge law adoption 
occurred in 1959 and the latest in 1994.  Few wrongful discharge laws have been 
repealed, so that as of 2014, 42 states recognized the implied contract doctrine, 43 states 
recognized the public policy doctrine, and 11 states recognized the good faith doctrine. 
I find using weighted ordinary least squares fixed effects difference-in-difference 
regression on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data that the good 
faith doctrine significantly increases average real wages by 18.59 percent for all private-
sector workers, 17.18 percent for private-sector nonmanufacturing workers, 13.75 percent 
for male private-sector workers, 21.68 percent for female private-sector workers, 21.04 
percent for white private-sector workers, and 12.97 percent for nonwhite private-sector 
workers.  Using unconditional quantile regression methodology on the same data, I find 
significant increases across the marginal distribution of real wages, especially for median 
real wages of private-sector workers by 21.07 percent, of private-sector 
nonmanufacturing workers by 24.05 percent, of male private-sector workers by 21.07 
percent, of female private-sector workers by 20.02 percent, of white private-sector 
workers by 23.67 percent, and of nonwhite workers by 15.77 percent.   
I also find that the good faith doctrine lowers the probability by 5 percent that 
female private-sector workers have real wages that would bring a family of two (one 
adult and one child) an income less than or equal to the federal poverty level, and lowers 
the probability by 7 percent that female private-sector workers have real wages sufficient 
to bring a family of three (one adult and two children) an income less than or equal to 125 
percent of the federal poverty level.  I also find that one other wrongful discharge law, the 
implied contract doctrine, significantly increases average real wages for private-sector 
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manufacturing workers by 4.77 percent, and increases the bottom 40% of the marginal 
distribution of private-sector manufacturing workers’ real wages by 7.78 percent.  
The standard supply-and-demand model of the labor market predicts that 
employment protection policies will cause a decrease in wages, provided the increase in 
firing costs is not offset by an increase in marginal productivity of labor.  Labor demand 
shifts inward, so, all else equal, the equilibrium wage will decline.  However, as Autor et. 
al. 2006 and Blanchard and Portugal (2001) explain, by increasing workers’ bargaining 
power vis-à-vis employers, employment protection can also allow workers to prevail in 
bargaining over wage hikes, especially in worksites paying non-competitive efficiency 
wages.  Thus, in effect, labor supply might shift inward.  Autor et. al. (2006) find no 
statistically significant effect on wages following state adoption of wrongful discharge 
laws in the U.S. over the 1980s and 1990s.   The authors posit that their finding of 
reduced employment suggests an inward demand shift, and the lack of a negative wage 
effect reflects a countervailing upward supply shift driven by workers’ rising bargaining 
power.   
I broaden this investigation beyond using only the Current Population Survey Merged 
Outgoing Rotation Group files because this data is made up of repeated cross-sections 
that may be biased by compositional shifts associated with policy adoption.  I utilize the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data to permit the analysis of changes 
in the same workers’ wages before and after policy adoption.  This data permits 
controlling for firm size, in contrast to the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing 
Rotation Group files that contain no information on firms.  Firm size, given the 
institutional peculiarities of wrongful discharge laws, is an important factor influencing 
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the extent of impact of policy adoption.  Large firms have the resources to retain 
management-side lawyers, and are often able to outmaneuver wrongful discharge laws.  
Meanwhile small firms are often caught off guard and face the full cost of these policies.  
Autor et. al. (2007) analyzes the impact of wrongful discharge laws on productivity using 
industry-state-year panel data incorporating firm-level fixed effects.  The authors find 
that adoption of the good faith doctrine is associated with significant increases in labor 
productivity, a result that mirrors, and helps explain, my finding of positive significant 
effects of the good faith doctrine on wages.  Another reason the good faith doctrine 
strongly effects productivity and wages could be its more sporadic, and harder to 
anticipate, adoption across state and year.  Given my inclusion of firm size controls, as 
well as the ability to track the changes in individual workers’ wages overtime, my wage 
results differ from those in Autor et. al. (2006) in terms of significant positive effects 
following adoption of the good faith doctrine, though I similarly find few wage effects 
associated with adoption of the implied contract and public policy doctrines. 
Previous Literature 
 
Van der Wiel (2010) uses a 1999 reform to Dutch labor law that increased the 
period of notice required for dismissal for younger and less tenured workers while 
decreasing that required for older and higher seniority workers, in order to analyze the 
effect of employment protection on wages.  She proposes the standard prediction of 
falling wages from an inward shift in labor demand.  However, she also posits that wages 
might increase because of rising worker bargaining power, citing Bertola (1990), 
represented by an inward shift of labor supply, or because of rising labor productivity 
fueled by investment in capital or workers’ skills, represented by an outward shift of 
 35 
labor demand.  This later explanation, while understudied, is nonetheless echoed in the 
textbook discussion of employment protection found in Nickell and Layard (1999), and 
may help link Autor et. al.’s (2007) finding of the good faith doctrine associated with 
increased labor productivity with my finding of the good faith doctrine associated with 
increased wages.  
Van der Wiel performs a fixed effects difference in differences regression to 
investigate the impact of policy change on real wages, and finds an increase of between 
3% and 5%, with greater increases for low-skilled workers.  She also performs a probit 
model analysis on the impact of policy adoption on the probability a worker enrolls in job 
training, and finds a roughly 7% significant decline.  These results together suggest that, 
at least in the Dutch context of centralized collective bargaining over wages between 
organized labor and employer federations, the bargaining power, rather than skill or 
capital investment, explanation of wage hikes from employment protection seems most 
plausible.  Given low unionization and bargaining power, but high skill level, of U.S. 
workers, Van der Wiel’s analysis motivates my interest in investigating if any wage 
increases follow wrongful discharge law adoption, and whether these increases are 
motivated by increased bargaining power or investment in skill or capital. 
Leonardi and Pica (2010), investigating a policy providing severance to small 
firms in Italy, estimate the effect of employment protection on wages for high and low 
bargaining power demographic groups and find negative effects on wages for the latter, 
especially for younger, less tenured, and blue-collar workers.  These results contrast 
somewhat with those in this paper, in so far as I find that women’s wage gains outstrip 
those of men, and nonmanufacturing workers’ wage gains surpass those of manufacturing 
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workers.  However, the results in this paper are similar to Leonardi and Pica’s (2010) 
findings because the increases for white workers are greater than those for nonwhite 
workers, negative wage effects occur at the bottom of the marginal distribution of real 
wages, and positive wage effects grow in magnitude moving up the marginal distribution 
of real wages.  One reason for the discrepancy in results by demographic group between 
this analysis and Leonardi and Pica (2010) is that increases in wages brought by the good 
faith doctrine might reflect the role of training and learning-by-doing in boosting labor 
productivity, rather than solely the impact of increased worker bargaining power.  The 
bargaining power effect biases wage increases toward workers with the highest wages 
prior to policy adoption.  
My paper adds to the literature on the impact of employment protection on labor 
markets by being the first to investigate the impact of wrongful discharge laws on wages 
by gender, race, detailed industrial categories, and by quantiles of the marginal 
distribution of wages.  My results show that wrongful discharge laws, whether by 
increasing workers’ bargaining power or by increasing their labor productivity, boost 
workers’ wages, particularly for women, minorities, and workers in nonmanufacturing 
industries who have suffered from recent economic changes.  The evidence that the good 
faith doctrine lowers the likelihood that women earn wages providing income at or below 
the federal poverty level is especially important, given the large and growing share of 
single female heads of households in the United States.  For instance, as a recent 
investigation by Pew (2015) found, while in 1960 5% of all children were born to single 
female heads of households, by 2014 40% of all children were born to single female 
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heads of households.  These families had median annual income of $24,000 in 2014, 
while married families with male breadwinners had median annual income of $84,500. 
Data Sources 
 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
 
My primary data source is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(hereafter NLSY79), a yearly panel of 12,682 men and women that were between the 
ages of 14 and 22 in the year 1979.  It contains data on a range of information about these 
individuals’ life histories, working conditions, and personal beliefs from 1979 to present.  
I construct my outcome variable of real hourly wage in one’s primary job, using real year 
2000 U.S. dollars and the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers.  Following the common practice within research on wages, I drop observations 
for wages below $1.50 per hour or above $100 per hour.  I pull demographic information 
from the data set to construct indicator variables for gender (male vs. female), age (14-24 
vs. 25-58), education (high school or less vs. at least some college), and race (white vs. 
nonwhite).  I extract data on industry classification of workers’ primary jobs to construct 
indicators for employment within construction, manufacturing, transportation, 
communication, utilities, health care and social services, wholesale trade, and retail trade 
industries.  I create dummies for the size of the firm where workers’ primary jobs reside, 
measured in terms of the total number of employees (0-19 vs. 20-49 vs. 50-99 vs. 100 
and above) per firm.  Finally, I construct indicators for census region and state of 
workers’ residence from the restricted use geocode files I was given access to by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. I drop data for self-employed and public-sector workers, since 
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wrongful discharge laws only apply to private-sector workers employed by an individual 
or entity other than themselves. 
Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group 
 
In order to perform a sensitivity analysis on my NLSY79 wage research, as well 
as to gather sufficient data to investigate effects within the important nonmanufacturing 
industries of transportation and communications, I draw upon the Current Population 
Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group files (hereafter CPS-MORG) for 1979-2013.  I 
construct my main outcome variable of real wages as the usual weekly earnings divided 
by usual weekly hours, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners 
and Clerical Workers to convert observations to real year 2000 U.S. dollars.  As in the 
first data set, I drop observations for wages below $1.50 per hour and above $100 per 
hour, as well as for self-employed and public-sector workers.  I pull demographic data to 
construct dummies for gender (male vs. female), age (16-39 vs. 40-64), education (high 
school or less vs. at least some college), and race (white vs. nonwhite).  I construct 
industry indicators for workers’ primary employment in construction, manufacturing, 
transportation, communication, utilities, health care and social services, wholesale trade, 
and retail trade.  I also pull geographic information to construct indicators for state and 
census region of workers’ residence.  
Legal Variables 
This paper uses state court decisions from 1979 through 2014 to construct 
explanatory variables on wrongful discharge doctrine adoptions.  I employ the method of 
Morris (1995) by coding the first state supreme court or intermediate appellate court 
ruling that demonstrates a clear acceptance of each of the three wrongful discharge 
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doctrines.  I construct legal adoption variables at the yearly-level from 1979 to 2014 to 
match the NLSY79 data, and on a monthly basis from the year 1979 through 2013, in 
order to match data available at the monthly-level for these years from the CPS-MORG 
files. Both forms of this data set contain the sustained (i.e. at least five-year long) 
adoption of the implied contract doctrine by 36 states, the public policy doctrine by 36 
states, and the good faith doctrine by 10 states. 
Econometric Models 
 
Difference in Differences Regression 
 
Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Since state adoption of wrongful discharge laws is an idiosyncratic function of the 
decisions of state supreme court and intermediate appellate court justices, as well as of 
the cases that emerge and rise to the docket of these courts, I have numerous natural 
experiments over the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the effect of employment protection 
on workers’ wages.  My main specification is the following difference in differences 
fixed effects regression of log real hourly earnings: 
wijstdf  = β1Treatst  + β2Postst + β3TreatstPostst + γs + δt + πj  
 
+ κd + λf + θi + β4 Postpostst + δt x Regiont + εijstdf    (1) 
 
where wijstdf is 100 times the log real hourly wage of individual i, in state s, at year t, in 
industry d, and within a firm of size f.   
Treatst  is an indicator for the five-year period from 2 years before to 2 years after 
the year of adoption of a wrongful-discharge law in adopting state s.  Postst is an indicator 
for the period from the year of adoption through 2 years after the year of adoption for all 
states, both adopting and nonadopting.  TreatstPostst  is an interaction term representing 
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the three-year period following policy adoption in the treatment state only. Postpostst  is a 
dummy variable that represents each state that reenters the control group 3 years after the 
year of policy adoption to account for any bias caused by enduring effects.  These 
window lengths are the same as those in Autor et. al. (2006) for consistency10.  
The coefficient of interest β3 is an estimate of the pre-post change in real wages of 
individuals in adopting states relative to the corresponding change in real wages of 
individuals in non-adopting states.  Identification of β3 comes from variation in real 
wages of individuals between adopting and nonadopting states over the five years, two 
before to two years after the year of policy adoption, within U.S. Census region, industry, 
demographic, and firm size groups. This specification gives an estimate of the causal 
effect of policy adoption controlling for a variety of state, regional, national, industry, 
firm size, and year-specific characteristics that influence wages and are correlated with 
policy adoption.  Over the years 1979 through 2014, private-sector real year 2000 hourly 
                                                 
10 To illustrate the legal doctrine adoption variables, consider the following example.  Massachusetts 
adopted the implied contract doctrine in 1988, while neighboring Rhode Island did not adopt any wrongful 
discharge law over the period studied.  Massachusetts is a treatment state, so the variable Treatst takes on 
the value one for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990, and takes on the value of zero in years before 
1986 and after 1990.  Since Rhode Island did not adopt any wrongful discharge law over the five years 
surrounding adoption of the implied contract doctrine in Massachusetts, Treatst always remains zero in this 
state.  In this case, Rhode Island is included within the control group.  The variable Postst takes on the value 
one in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and in all other states, for all years that this policy remains in effect 
in Massachusetts, beginning with the year of adoption, which in this case is the year 1988 to the end of the 
dataset in 2014.  Treatst* Postst is an interaction term representing the three-year period, in the treatment 
state only (i.e. Massachusetts), beginning with the year of adoption of the implied contract doctrine in 
1988.   In other words, Treatst* Postst takes on the value one only in Massachusetts and only for the years 
1988, 1989, and 1990.  Maine, another neighboring state, also did not adopt any wrongful discharge laws 
over the five years surrounding 1988, so it is included within the control group.  However, Maine adopted 
the implied contract doctrine in 1978.  In this case, the variable Postpostst switches from zero to one for 
Maine starting the year after the treatment window for its adoption ended, which is 1981, and takes on the 
value one for the rest of sample period until 2014.  If Massachusetts becomes eligible as a control for a later 
state adoption, its Postpostst variable, which switches on beginning in 1991, would take on the same role as 
it plays in Maine in this example. One important consequence of this five year treatment window structure 
for the fixed effect specification is that it omits analysis of policy adoptions occurring in 1979 and 1980. 
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wages in the NLSY79 sample have a mean of $12.18, median of $9.79, standard 
deviation of $8.39, and variation of $70.41. 
The variable αs is a state intercept that captures idiosyncratic, unobserved, and 
pre-existing features of each relevant state impacting wages irrespective of the year of 
observation.  δt  are fixed time effects controlling for yearly state-invariant shifts in the 
regression intercept, accounting for common national shocks to wages.  δt x Regions are 
interactions of the four U.S. Census regions with year fixed effects, and control for 
transitory regional shocks to wages.  πj  is a vector of demographic group indicators for 
sixteen demographic groups [i.e. (male vs. female) X (ages 14-24 vs. 25-58) X (high 
school or less vs. at least some college) X (white vs. nonwhite)].  κd are indicator 
variables representing the industry a worker’s primary employment resides within as 
defined by eight major industrial classifications (i.e. construction, manufacturing, 
transportation, communication, utilities, health care and social services, wholesale trade, 
or retail trade industries).  λf represents dummies for four categories of firm size (i.e. total 
number of employees per firm of 0-19 vs. 20-49 vs. 50-99 vs. 100 and above).  θi is an 
indicator for if an individual ever moves from one state of residence to another during the 
sample time period, and controls for unobservable characteristics of movers impacting 
wages.  Each regression is weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust 
standard errors are used to account for within-state error correlations.  In regressions 
using only data within industry subsamples, the indicators for workers’ industry of 
primary employment κd are necessarily dropped.  In regressions using only data within 
demographic group subsamples, the vector of indicator variables for demographic 
characteristics of workers πj are necessarily dropped. 
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 In the sensitivity analysis using the CPS-MORG data set, I use a version of 
specification 1 identical aside from the vector of demographic dummies, πj, has a higher 
separation between younger and older workers (i.e. ages 16-39 vs. 40-64 as opposed to 
ages 14-24 vs. 25-58), since the average age is higher in the CPS-MORG cross-sectional 
data than the youth-focused household survey data of the NLSY79.  Also, since the CPS-
MORG does not contain information on the size of firms, this version of specification 1 
lacks indicators for firm size, λf.  This final distinction is significant because larger firms 
are more likely than smaller firms to anticipate and contract around wrongful discharge 
laws.  Larger firms have resources to retain skilled company lawyers that advise against 
establishing company policies that create employment protection such as including 
employment-at-will disclaimers within employee handbooks.  These regressions use CPS 
earnings weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the state-level are used 
to account for within-state error correlations.  In regressions using data within 
demographic group subsamples, the vector of indicator variables for demographic 
characteristics of workers πj is necessarily dropped, and in regressions using only data 
within industry subsamples, the indicators for industry of primary employment κd is 
dropped. 
Unconditional Quantile Regression  
In order to investigate the impact of wrongful discharge laws on the quantiles of 
the marginal distribution of wages I employ unconditional quantile regression, as 
developed by Firpo et. al. (2009), using a recentered-influence function (hereafter RIF) of 
the outcome variable.  The RIF for the τth quantile, Qτ, is defined as: 
 𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑓, 𝑄𝜏) =  [𝑄𝜏  +
𝜏
𝑓(𝑄𝜏)
] −
1(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑓 < 𝑄𝜏)
𝑓(𝑄𝜏)
=  𝑘 𝜏 −  
1(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑓 < 𝑄𝜏)
𝑓(𝑄𝜏)
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I estimate the following regression for every decile, 𝑄𝜏  = 0.10 to 𝑄𝜏 = 0.90, using the 
same difference in differences estimation methodology for wrongful discharge policy 
adoptions as employed for average effects in equation 1: 
RIF(wijstdf ,Qτ) = β1Treatst  + β2Postst + β3TreatstPostst + γs + δt + πj  
 
+ κd + λf + θi + β4 Postpostst + δt x Regiont + εijstdf    (2) 
 
Equation 2 is identical in all respects to equation 1, aside from the implementation of the 
RIF methodology using the dependent variable.  The same distinctions hold as when 
using equation 1 regarding the higher age cut-off within the age demographic indicator 
variable, the dropping of firm size indicator variables, and the substitution of CPS 
earnings weights for NLSY79 yearly sample weights when employing this specification 
using CPS-MORG data.  Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the state-level 
are used to account for within-state error correlations.  In regressions using only data 
within demographic group subsamples, the vector of indicator variables for demographic 
characteristics of workers πj are necessarily dropped, and in regressions using only data 
within industry subsamples, the indicators for industry of primary employment κd are 
dropped. 
Unconditional Quantile Regression with Leads and Lags 
 
To give some picture of the dynamic effects of wrongful discharge doctrines on 
wages over the years leading up to and following policy adoption, I utilize a differences-
in-differences unconditional quantile regression with yearly leads and lags from two 
years before to two years after the year of policy adoption in order to investigate the 
impact on the wages of low-wage manufacturing industry workers.  I use the following 
specification, evaluated at Qτ = 0.4, to analyze the impact on the bottom 40% of private-
sector manufacturing workers’ marginal distribution of wages: 
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RIF(wijstdf ,Qτ = 0.4) = ∑  2𝑚=−2 ηm Ls,t-m + γs + δt + πj + λf + θi + δt x Regions+ ԑijstdf   (3) 
 
All variables are as in equations 1 and 2, aside from the dummy variable Ls,t, which 
switches on from zero to one during the year a state court adopts a wrongful discharge 
doctrine, and permits the estimation of the impact over the first year following adoption 
of each doctrine on real wages in adopting states relative to nonadopting states.  The 
parameter of interest ηm gives the first-year impact of the adoption of wrongful discharge 
laws on real wages between adopting and nonadopting states.  Identification of ηm comes 
from within region, within industry, within demographic group, within firm size, and 
within mover and nonmover group variation in real wages between individuals in 
adopting and nonadopting states.  In order to match the results for the full fixed effects 
regression, the overall sample window of adoptions analyzed was restricted to 1981 
through 2011, ensuring the overall number of adoptions actually studied remains the 
same (i.e. implied contract doctrine by 36 states, the public policy doctrine by 36 states, 
and the good faith doctrine by 10 states).  As I use data from NLSY79, this specification 
contains variables on firm size and mover vs. nonmover status, and uses the lower age 
cut-off within the demographic indicator variables.  Since I focus on the manufacturing 
subsample, I necessarily drop the indicator for industry of primary employment.  The 
specification is weighted by NLSY79 sample weights, and uses Huber-White robust 
standard errors clustered at the state-level.  
Probit Model 
 
I use the following reduced form probit model on the subsample of women from the 
NLSY79: 
Pr(yijstdf ,γs, δt, πj, κd,λf, θi,δt x Regions)=Φ(β1 dst + γs + δt + κd + λf + θi  + δt x Regions)  (4) 
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The dependent variable, yijstdf, represents two separate but similar dichotomous outcomes 
measuring, respectively, whether a woman’s real hourly wage is less than or equal to 
$6.81 per hour in year 2000 U.S. dollars, the wage sufficient to provide a family of two 
(i.e. one parent and one child) an income equal to the federal poverty level, and whether a 
woman’s real hourly wage is less than or equal to $9.94 per hour in year 2000 U.S. 
dollars, the wage sufficient to provide a family of three (i.e. one parent and two children) 
an income equal to 125 percent of the federal poverty level.  This specification includes 
all of the same right-hand-side variables as equation 1, with the exception that the legal 
adoption variable, dst, captures the effect of each wrongful discharge law over the entire 
time period they are in effect, representing the period, in most cases, from adoption until 
then end of the sample in 2014.  In this instance, β1, the coefficient of interest, provides 
an estimate of the direct effect of wrongful discharge laws on the probability women earn 
“poverty wages”.  Since the regression is performed using the subsample of women 
workers, the vector of demographic group categories πj is necessarily dropped.  The 
specification is weighted by NLSY79 yearly sample weights, and uses Huber-White 
robust standard errors clustered at the state-level.    
Results 
Event Study Difference in Differences Regression:  NLSY79 sample 
The first column of Tables 1 through 7 show estimates of the impact of wrongful 
discharge laws on average wages, using the coefficient of interest β3 of the fixed effects 
difference in differences regression of equation 1, while the second through ninth 
columns show the effect across the marginal distribution of real wages, using the 
coefficient of interest β3 of the difference in differences unconditional quantile regression 
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of equation 2.   Table B1 illustrates results for all private-sector workers, while Tables 2 
through 7 show findings for specific industry and demographic group subsamples. 
Interesting differences in magnitude and significance of impact occur across industries, 
demographic groups, and wage deciles.  The general image emerges, however, of a 
statistically significant positive effect of the good faith doctrine upon wages, both on 
average and across the marginal distribution of real wages.   
Private-sector 
Table B1 reveals that adoption of the good faith doctrine is associated with 
significant increases in real wages for all private-sector workers on average by 18.59 
percent, and from the bottom 20 percent to the top 90 percent of the marginal distribution 
of private-sector workers’ real wages.  It shows an increase of 9.00 percent for the bottom 
20 percent of the private-sector real wage distribution, 21.07 percent for the median, and 
the largest increase of 30.20 percent for the highest decile of the private-sector real wage 
distribution.  Table B1 shows no significant impact of the implied contract or public 
policy doctrines on private-sector real wages, save a modestly significant increase for the 
top 80 percent of the private-sector real wage marginal distribution following adoption of 
the public policy doctrine of 8.73 percent. 
Female 
Table B2 shows that the good faith doctrine increases average real wages for 
female private-sector workers by 21.68 percent, driven by significant increases across 
every decile of the marginal distribution of female private-sector workers’ real wages.  
For instance, the good faith doctrine raises real wages by 13.06 percent for the bottom 10 
percent of the distribution of female private-sector workers’ real wages, increases the 
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median of their real wages by 20.02 percent, and has the largest increase for the top 80 
percent of private-sector female workers’ real wages by 34.92 percent.  The implied 
contract doctrine raises the bottom decile of female private-sector workers’ real wages by 
5.57 percent, and the public policy doctrine raises the top decile by 11.87 percent. 
Male 
Table B3 illustrates that the good faith doctrine raises average real wages for male 
private-sector workers by 13.75 percent.  While the good faith doctrine lowers the bottom 
10 percent of male private-sector workers’ real wages by 11.66 percent, it increases the 
bottom 30 percent to the top 90 percent of their marginal distribution of real wages.  For 
instance, the good faith doctrine increases the bottom 30 percent of male private-sector 
workers’ real wages by 10.15 percent, the median by 21.07 percent, and the top 60 
percent by 26.33 percent.  Male private-sector workers at the very low-end of the wage 
distribution experience decline in their wages, representing a bargaining power effect, as 
explained by Leonardi and Pica (2010), because workers with lower pre-policy adoption 
pay are unlikely to have the initial bargaining power needed to make use of wrongful 
discharge laws in securing wage gains from their employers.  Although the implied 
contract doctrine has a marginally significant positive effect on male private-sector 
workers’ average real wages, and the public policy doctrine has a marginally significant 
positive effect on the top 80 percent of their marginal distribution of real wages, the 
results are broadly consistent with previous findings of little significant effect of these 
two policies on wages. 
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White 
Table B4 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on the real wages of white 
private-sector workers.  The good faith doctrine increases average real wages for white 
private-sector workers by 21.04 percent, as well as from the bottom 20 percent to the top 
90 percent of their marginal distribution of real wages, with an 11.41 percent increase for 
the second decile, a 23.67 percent increase at the median, and the largest increase of 
34.20 percent for the top 90 percent.  The implied contract doctrine and the public policy 
doctrine have no significant effect on the real wages of white private-sector workers. 
Nonwhite 
In comparison, Table B5 reveals the impact of wrongful discharge laws on the 
real wages of nonwhite private-sector workers.  Table B5 shows that the good faith 
doctrine increases average real wages for nonwhite private-sector workers by 12.97 
percent, decreases real wages for the lowest 10 percent of their marginal distribution of 
real wages, but increases the bottom 30 percent to top 90 percent.  The good faith 
doctrine increases the bottom 30 percent of the marginal distribution of nonwhite private-
sector workers’ real wages by 13.13 percent, the median by 15.77 percent, and the top 90 
percent by 37.70 percent.  The magnitude of impact for nonwhite private-sector workers 
is less than for white private-sector workers, and differs by declining for the very lowest 
decile, suggesting the importance of bargaining power differentials.  The implied contract 
doctrine has a marginally significant positive effect on average nonwhite private-sector 
workers’ wages of 3.78 percent, for the bottom 20 percent of their marginal distribution 
of real wages by 6.47 percent, and for the bottom 30 percent by 6.17 percent.  The public 
policy doctrine has a statistically significant positive effect on nonwhite private-sector 
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workers’ average real wages of 4.77 percent, for the lowest decile by 7.05 percent, for the 
bottom 30 percent by 6.55 percent, and for the top 90 percent by 13.66 percent. 
Nonmanufacturing 
Table B6 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on private-sector 
nonmanufacturing workers’ real wages.  Table B6 reveals that the good faith doctrine 
increases average real wages for private-sector nonmanufacturing workers by 17.18 
percent, reflecting increases from the bottom 20 percent to the top 90 percent of their 
marginal distribution of wages.  For instance, the good faith doctrine increases the bottom 
20 percent of the private-sector nonmanufacturing workers’ marginal distribution of real 
wages by 5.77 percent, the median by 24.05 percent, and the top 90 percent by 28.16 
percent.  The implied contract and public policy doctrines have no significant impact on 
private-sector nonmanufacturing workers’ real wages. 
Manufacturing 
Table B7 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on private-sector 
manufacturing workers’ real wages.  While the good faith doctrine has a marginally 
significant positive impact on average real wages of private-sector manufacturing 
workers of 10.95 percent, it has a marginally significant negative effect of 11.44 percent 
on the bottom decile of their marginal distribution of real wages.  The good faith doctrine 
also has a significant negative effect on the bottom 20 percent of private-sector 
manufacturing workers’ marginal distribution of real wages of 9.51 percent, but a 
significant positive effect on the top 80 and 90 percent by 14.78 percent and 26.84 
percent, respectively.  This pattern shows the strongest evidence out of all of the results 
of this study of a differential effect based on workers’ position within the marginal 
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distribution of real wages, likely reflecting the role of pre-existing bargaining power in 
workers’ ability to utilize wrongful discharge laws in wage bargaining.   
The implied contract doctrine increases average real wages for private-sector 
manufacturing workers by 4.77 percent, and increases the bottom 40 percent of the 
marginal distribution of private-sector manufacturing workers’ real wages by 7.78 
percent.  The public policy doctrine has little effect, aside from a significant increase of 
8.20 percent in the top 80 percent of private-sector manufacturing workers’ marginal 
distribution of real wages.  While the good faith doctrine boosts wages for high-wage 
manufacturing workers, the implied contract doctrine increases wages around the median 
of the marginal distribution of manufacturing workers’ real wages.  Since this result is 
unique compared to the findings of the impact of the implied contract doctrine on wages 
in all other cases, I focus the event study in Figure B1 discussed in the next section on 
low-wage manufacturing workers. 
Event Study:  Manufacturing Workers’ Wages 
Figure B1 shows the results of the event study, using equation 3, of the impact of 
the implied contract doctrine on the bottom 40 percent of the marginal distribution of 
private-sector manufacturing workers’ real wages from two-years prior to two-years 
following the year of policy adoption.  This analysis tests whether the positive significant 
five-year fixed effects regression results have a causal interpretation in so far as they 
reveal that the increase in wages began only after policy adoption, satisfying the 
important causal assumptions of time order and parallel pre-period trends.  Figure B1 
shows a statistically insignificant and near-zero effect prior to policy adoption, and a 
sharp increase beginning in the year of adoption continuing through three years following 
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policy adoption.  Importantly, the change over all years appears to match the total fixed 
effects regression result from the analysis, moving from a minimum of close to -2 percent 
prior to adoption to a maximum of close to 5 percent post-adoption, indicating an overall 
effect of about 7 percent over the five-year period.   
Fixed Effects Difference in Differences Regression:  CPS MORG subsamples 
Nonmanufacturing: Communications Industry 
As a further sensitivity analysis, I use the CPS-MORG cross-sectional data set to 
investigate the impact of wrongful discharge laws on average real wages and the 
marginal distribution of real wages.  While I performed all previous regressions from the 
NLSY79 analysis on the data from CPS-MORG (i.e. all tables are available upon request 
from author), I highlight the regressions on two subsamples of nonmanufacturing 
workers, respectively, within private-sector communications and transportation 
industries.  Unlike the NLSY79 data set, the CPS-MORG files are large enough to permit 
analysis of detailed subsamples of nonmanufacturing workers.   
However, the results of all previous regressions using the CPS-MORG are smaller 
in magnitude and less consistently significant, despite having the same direction of 
change as results using NLSY79 data.  This may reflect, in no small part, the exclusion of 
the important firm size controls, since analysis using NLSY79 data reveal large and 
significant wage effects in firms with less than 100 employees, but no significant effect in 
firms with over 100 employees (i.e. tables of results for workers in firms with less than 
and more than 100 employees are also available upon request from the author).  Failing to 
control for firm size may downwardly bias estimates of the effect of policy adoption on 
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wages, reflecting the fact that larger firms often retain management-side lawyers that help 
firms anticipate and evade the costs of wrongful discharge laws. 
Table B8 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on workers’ average real 
wages, and the marginal distribution of real wages, within the communication industry, a 
large and growing portion of nonmanufacturing industry from 1979 to 2014.  The good 
faith doctrine increases average real wages of communication industry workers by 5.09 
percent, as well as from the bottom 30 percent, by 10.09 percent, to the top 60 percent of 
their marginal distribution of real wages, by 7.64 percent.  The good faith doctrine also 
increases the top decile of their real wage distribution by 8.80 percent.  The implied 
contract and public policy doctrines have little significant effect on real wages of 
communication workers, save for an increase of 4.18 percent in the top 90 percent of 
their marginal distribution of real wages following adoption of the implied contract 
doctrine. 
Nonmanufacturing:  Transportation Industry 
Table B9 reveals the effect of wrongful discharge laws on real wages of workers 
within the private-sector transportation industry, another immensely important and 
growing segment of nonmanufacturing in the U.S. from 1979 to 2014.  For context, a 
2015 investigation conducted by Quoctrung Bui of National Public Radio, using data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, found that truck driving, an expansive occupational 
category covering jobs as varied as long-distance over-the-road transportation of goods 
and local delivery of goods to businesses and households, emerged as the most common 
job across 23 U.S. states starting in 1990.  By 1996, truck driving grew to be the most 
prevalent job across 29 U.S. states, a position it has maintained until 2014.  The study 
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proposes that truck driving flourished as an occupation because it was least hurt by 
globalization, and largely exempt from automation. 
Table B9 illustrates that the good faith doctrine increases average real wages of 
private-sector transportation industry workers by 4.06 percent, the bottom 40 percent of 
their marginal distribution of real wages by 5.47 percent, the median by 5.93 percent, and 
the top 60 percent by 6.12 percent.  In contrast to previous subsample analyses, the 
highest decile with a significant effect, the top 70 percent of the marginal distribution of 
their real wages, saw the smallest increase by 3.85 percent.  Private-sector transportation 
workers, it seems, saw the most concentrated increase in real wages, bunched up around 
the median of their marginal distribution of real wages, perhaps reflecting the greater role 
of organized labor in mediating wage increases within the industry.  The implied contract 
doctrine also significantly increases private-sector transportation workers’ real wages 
around the median of their marginal distribution of real wages, for the bottom 40 percent 
by 3.61 percent, the median by 3.86 percent, and the top 60 percent by 3.99 percent.  
These results drive a marginally significant increase in average real wages for private-
sector transportation workers of 2.42 percent. 
One additional reason for the significant effect of wrongful discharge laws within 
private-sector transportation industry is the industry has traditionally been composed of 
numerous small firms.  For instance, one factor that sets labor relations within the 
trucking industry apart from elsewhere in the economy is the dominance of a single large 
labor union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, that collectively bargains with 
numerous small employers.  Since the NLSY79 sample demonstrates larger increases for 
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firms with fewer than 100 employees, private-sector transportation industry may be 
especially impacted by these policies given its smaller average firm size. 
Probit Model: Probability Women Are Low-Wage Workers 
Table B10 shows results from the probit model of equation 4 regarding the impact 
of wrongful discharge laws on the probability that female private-sector workers earn a 
real wage sufficient to bring a family of two (i.e. one parent and one child) to the federal 
poverty level, and a real wage sufficient to bring a family of three (i.e. one parent and two 
children) to 125% of the federal poverty level.  Table B10 shows that the good faith 
doctrine is associated with a decline in the probability of the former by 5 percent and of 
the later by 7 percent.  Table B10 shows that the public policy doctrine is also associated 
with significant, but smaller, declines in both probabilities by 4 percent, while the implied 
contract doctrine has no impact on the probability female private-sector workers earn 
“poverty wages”.   
Conclusion 
Wrongful discharge laws are an important factor shaping the new labor market 
that emerged following the unraveling of private-sector collective bargaining in the 
United States.  My results show that two of these policies, the good faith doctrine and the 
implied contract doctrine, promote wage growth among all private-sector workers, but 
especially for women, minorities, and workers in nonmanufacturing industries such as 
communications and transportation, important and growing portions of the labor market.  
The evidence that the good faith doctrine lowers the likelihood of women earning 
poverty-level wages bodes well for efforts to reduce poverty and inequality, given that 
children and mothers in single-parent households make up the largest segment of 
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individuals living in poverty in the United States and because of persistent inequality 
related to the undervaluing of work traditionally performed by women.  The evidence of 
small but highly significant increases for transportation and communication industry 
workers takes on added relevance as the occupation of truck driving, and tech 
occupations, continue to predominate within the labor market. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF ADOPTION OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LAWS ON 
TENURE AND TRAINING:  1979-2014 
 
 
Abstract:    Recent empirical literature on wrongful discharge laws, a court-based form of 
employment protection in the United States, finds that one particular policy, the good 
faith doctrine, raises labor productivity by incentivizing firms’ substitution of capital for 
labor.  This paper estimates, using individual-level data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979, weighted ordinary least squares fixed effects regression, 
unconditional quantile regression, and probit model methodology, the effect of wrongful 
discharge laws on job tenure and training, to other drivers of labor productivity.  I find 
that the good faith doctrine significantly raises average weeks of job tenure by 31.11 
percent for all private-sector workers, and by 46.88 percent for private-sector 
nonmanufacturing workers, while increasing the probability that all private-sector and 
private-sector nonmanufacturing workers are employed for three or more years by 7%.  
The good faith doctrine also raises the likelihood that all private-sector workers and 
private-sector nonmanufacturing workers receive on-the-job training by 5%, and that 
nonwhite workers receive on-the-job training by 8%.  The good faith doctrine increases 
the probability by between 20 and 30 percent that training lasts at least 40 hours per week 
for all private-sector, private-sector nonmanufacturing, and female private-sector 
workers. Since increases in labor productivity make possible growth in wages, wrongful 
discharge laws may be a useful tool in promoting real wage growth, a necessary factor in 
challenging persistent income inequality. 
 
 
Keywords: tenure, training, unconditional quantile regression, wrongful discharge laws, 
employment protection  
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Introduction 
 
Wrongful discharge laws, a form of judicial employment protection in the United 
States, have been a topic of considerable study in labor economics, as their near random 
adoption across states over the 1980s and 1990s permit many natural experiments 
regarding the impact of employment protection on economic outcomes.  While much of 
this literature focuses on the impact of increased firing costs on employers’ ability to 
adjust along the employment margin, a small but important series of studies investigates 
the impact on firm productivity, driven by changes in investment in capital, technology, 
and labor.  My paper adds to this literature by analyzing the effect of wrongful discharge 
law adoption on workers’ job tenure and training.  My results suggest that wrongful 
discharge laws lead firms to respond to higher labor costs by investing in the skill level of 
their workforce, through direct training as well as the indirect route of increased learning-
by-doing, brought on by the added experience workers gain from longer time spent in the 
same jobs.  While previous work has found evidence wrongful discharge laws cause 
firms to employ more skilled workers, this is largely ancillary to investment in new 
capital and technology.  My results are unique in proposing increased job tenure and 
training of existing workers as way these policies increase the skilled share of the labor 
force and labor productivity.  
I find that the good faith doctrine significantly increases the average number of 
weeks of job tenure by 31.11 percent for all private-sector workers, and by 46.88 percent 
for private-sector nonmanufacturing workers. I also find that the good faith doctrine is 
associated with a 7 percent statistically significant increase in the probability that all 
private-sector and private-sector nonmanufacturing workers are employed for three or 
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more years.  I find that the good faith doctrine increases the likelihood that all private-
sector workers and private-sector nonmanufacturing workers receive on-the-job training 
by 5%, and that nonwhite private-sector workers receive on-the-job training by 8 percent.  
The good faith doctrine significantly increases by 20 percent the likelihood that on-the-
job training lasts at least 40 hours per week for all private-sector workers, by 29 percent 
for private-sector nonmanufacturing workers, and by 32 percent for female private-sector 
workers.   
Autor, Kugler, and Kerr (2007) investigate the impact of wrongful discharge laws 
on total factor productivity and labor productivity.  The authors use establishment-level 
data on employment for all industries from the Longitudinal Business Database.  The 
authors draw data on value-added, production and nonproduction employment, and 
expenditures on machinery and structures for the manufacturing industry from the 
Annual Survey of Manufacturers from 1976 to 1999.  The authors find that the good faith 
doctrine increases labor productivity in manufacturing, as a result of firms’ increased 
investment in machinery, and increased employment of skilled nonproduction workers.  
My finding of increased job tenure and on-the-job training following good faith doctrine 
adoption complements these results, since these factors can fuel labor productivity 
through greater learning-by-doing and skill acquisition.  However, Autor et. al. find that 
the good faith doctrine lowers total factor productivity in manufacturing by fostering 
excessive capital investment.  This result implies that labor productivity gains might 
come at the expenses of firms’ profits.   
Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) investigate the role that the Prospective 
Payment System (hereafter PPS), a 1984 change in U.S. Medicare policy that increased 
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the relative price of hospital labor relative to hospital capital and technology, had on 
hospitals’ investment in capital, labor, and technology.  The authors draw upon panel data 
collected by the American Hospital Association on hospitals’ expenditures on labor and 
capital, and on hospitals’ adoption of an extensive list of specific health care 
technologies, focusing on the three years before to three years following passage of the 
PPS, 1980 to 1986.  The authors find, consistent with neoclassical theory of the firm, that 
the PPS decreased expenditure on labor by about 7%, had no significant impact on capital 
expenditures, and increased the skill share of nurse employment (i.e. the share of 
registered nurses (RNs) over the sum of registered nurses and licensed practical nurses 
(LPNs)) by 1.67 percentage points.  The authors also find that, on average, the policy 
change led to the adoption of one additional technology per hospital.  These results 
demonstrate that, particularly for regulated industries, policies that increase labor costs 
might have the benefit of incentivizing capital investment, technology adoption, and skill 
investment in the form of increased employment of higher-skilled labor.  However, at 
least some of the increase in employment of RNs could come as a consequence of the re-
training and promotion of LPNs.   
Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) offer no explanation for regulated industries 
having the strongest results.  One reason may be that industries and firms already subject 
to considerable regulation have difficulty avoiding new rules, since they already have a 
history of direct government oversight, while less regulated industries and firms can more 
easily circumvent new rules given their lower probability of being caught violating them. 
Nickell and Layard (1999), in their textbook discussion of employment 
protection, provide a concise explanation of the role that tenure and training might play in 
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boosting firm productivity.  The authors note that since a pivotal ingredient in firm 
productivity growth lies in the participation of the labor force in production decisions, 
increased training and job longevity might foster workers’ ability to accumulate and share 
production knowledge with their employers.  Increases in labor productivity make wage 
growth possible, either in competitive labor markets where wages equal workers’ 
marginal productivity or in noncompetive labor markets where workers can bargain for a 
share of rising firm profits.  Wrongful discharge laws may be a useful tool in addressing 
the persistence of stagnant real wage and labor productivity growth, major factors driving 
persistent income inequality and low economic growth in recent years. 
Data Sources 
 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
 
My primary data source is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (hereafter 
NLSY79), a yearly panel of 12,682 men and women between the ages of 14 and 22 in 
1979 containing data on a range of information about individuals’ life experiences, 
working conditions, and personal beliefs from the 1979 to 2014.  I pull my first outcome 
variable of weeks of job tenure in workers’ primary jobs directly from NLSY79.  This 
variable accumulates in value over the duration of the period studied, as some workers 
remain in their primary jobs for many years.  I construct a related indicator variable for 
individuals employed in their primary job for at least three years, using the underlying 
data on weeks of job tenure and the threshold of 156.43 weeks, the weekly equivalent of 
three years.  I construct another indicator variable for individuals receiving on-the-job 
training in their primary job directly from data in NLSY79 regarding individuals’ 
participation in apprenticeship programs, employer-run job training, or on-the-job 
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trainings run by outside entities.  Next, I use data contained in NLSY79 on the usual 
hours per week an individual spends in trainings at their primary job to construct an 
indicator variable for individuals who train for at least 40 hours per week.   
I pull demographic information from the data set to construct indicator variables for 
gender (i.e. male vs. female), age (i.e. 14-24 vs. 25-58), education (i.e. high school or less 
vs. at least some college), and race (i.e. white vs. nonwhite).  I extract data on industry 
classification of workers’ primary job to construct indicators for employment within 
construction, manufacturing, transportation, communication, utilities, health care and 
social services, wholesale trade, and retail trade industries.  I create dummies for the size 
of the firm where workers’ primary jobs reside, measured in terms of total number of 
employees (i.e. 0-19 vs. 20-49 vs. 50-99 vs. 100 and above).  I construct indicators for 
census region and state of workers’ residence from the restricted use geocode files I was 
given access to by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  I drop data for self-employed and 
public-sector workers, since wrongful discharge laws apply only to private-sector 
workers employed by a business or individual other than themselves. 
Legal Variables 
I use state court decisions from 1970 through 2014 to construct explanatory 
variables on wrongful discharge doctrine adoptions.  I employ the method of Morris 
(1995) to construct legal adoption variables at the yearly-level from 1979 to 2014 to 
match the NLSY79 data source for outcome and control variables over this time period.   
The legal adoption data set over these years contains the sustained (i.e. at least five-year 
long) adoption of the implied contract doctrine by 36 states, the public policy doctrine by 
36 states, and the good faith doctrine by 10 states. 
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Econometric Models 
 
Difference in Differences Regression 
 
Ordinary Least Squares 
My main specification is the following fixed effects difference in differences 
regression of log weeks of job tenure: 
yijstdf  = β1Treatst  + β2Postst + β3TreatstPostst + γs + δt + πj  
 
 + κd +  δt x κd + λf + θi + β4 Postpostst + δt x Regiont + εijstdf    (1) 
 
where yijstdf is 100 times the natural logarithm of weeks of job tenure of individual i 
belonging to demographic group j in state s, at year t, in industry d, and within a firm size 
category f.   
Treatst  is an indicator for the five-year period from 2 years before to 2 years after the 
year of adoption of a wrongful-discharge law in treatment state s.  Postst is an indicator 
for the period from the year of adoption onwards for all states, both adopting and 
nonadopting.  TreatstPostst  is an interaction term representing the three-year period 
following policy adoption in the treatment state.  Postpostst  is a dummy variable that 
represents each state that reenters the control group 3 years after the year of policy 
adoption to account for any bias caused by enduring effects.  These window lengths are 
the same as the windows in Autor et. al. (2006) for consistency.  The coefficient of 
interest β3 is an estimate of the pre-post change in weeks of job tenure for workers in 
adopting states relative to the corresponding change in non-adopting states.   
The treatment observations in this fixed effects difference in differences regression 
analysis, following equation 1 of Autor et. al. (2006), consist of the five years 
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surrounding policy adoption of one of the three wrongful discharge doctrines, from two 
years before to two years after the year of policy change.  The control groups are 
composed of the states adopting none of the three wrongful discharge laws over the five 
years surrounding policy adoption in a treatment state.  States that adopted a wrongful 
discharge doctrine before the five-year period surrounding policy change in a treatment 
state enter the control group.  The five-year treatment and control window is used instead 
of a panel composed over the entire sample period to account for possible serial 
correlation in yearly tenure outcome data, as well as to identify discrete changes in weeks 
of job tenure attributable to policy adoption11.   
Identification of β3 comes from variation in individuals’ weeks of job tenure 
between adopting and nonadopting states over the five years, two before to two years 
after the year of policy adoption, within U.S. Census region, industry, demographic 
group, firm size category, and mover vs. nonmover category.  This specification gives an 
estimate of the causal effect of policy adoption controlling for a variety of state, regional, 
                                                 
11 To illustrate the legal doctrine adoption variables, consider the following example.  Massachusetts 
adopted the implied contract doctrine in 1988, while neighboring Rhode Island did not adopt any wrongful 
discharge law over the period studied.  Massachusetts is a treatment state, so the variable  Treatst takes on 
the value one for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990, and takes on the value of zero in years before 
1986 and after 1990.  Since Rhode Island did not adopt any wrongful discharge law over the five years 
surrounding adoption of the implied contract doctrine in Massachusetts, Treatst always remains zero in this 
state.  In this case, Rhode Island is included within the control group.  The variable Postst takes on the value 
one in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and in all other states, for all years that this policy remains in effect 
in Massachusetts, beginning with the year of adoption, which in this case is the year 1988 to the end of the 
dataset in 2014.  Treatst* Postst is an interaction term representing the three-year period, in the treatment 
state only (i.e. Massachusetts), beginning with the year of adoption of the implied contract doctrine in 
1988.   In other words, Treatst* Postst takes on the value one only in Massachusetts and only for the years 
1988, 1989, and 1990.  Maine, another neighboring state, also did not adopt any wrongful discharge laws 
over the five years surrounding 1988, so it is included within the control group.  However, Maine adopted 
the implied contract doctrine in 1978.  In this case, the variable Postpostst switches from zero to one for 
Maine starting the year after the treatment window for its adoption ended, which is 1981, and takes on the 
value one for the rest of sample period, that is, until 2014.  When Massachusetts becomes eligible as a 
control for later state adoptions, its Postpostst variable switches on, beginning in 1991, and takes on the 
same role as it plays in Maine in this example.  
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national, industry, firm size, and year-specific characteristics influencing job tenure and 
are correlated with policy adoption.  
 The variable αs is a state intercept capturing idiosyncratic, unobserved, and pre-
existing features of each relevant state impacting weeks of job tenure irrespective of the 
year of observation.  δt  are fixed time effects controlling for yearly state-invariant shifts 
in the regression intercept, accounting for common national shocks to workers’ weeks of 
job tenure.  δt x Regions are interactions of the four U.S. Census regions with year fixed 
effects, and control for transitory regional shocks to job tenure.  πj  is a vector of 
demographic group indicators for sixteen demographic groups [i.e. (male vs. female) X 
(ages 14-24 vs. 25-58) X (high school or less vs. at least some college) X (white vs. 
nonwhite)].  κd are indicator variables representing the industry each worker’s primary 
employment resides within as defined by eight major industrial classifications (i.e. 
construction, manufacturing, transportation, communication, utilities, health care and 
social services, wholesale trade, or retail trade industries).  δt x κd are interactions of the 
eight industrial classifications with year fixed effects, and control for transitory industry-
specific national shocks to job tenure.  λf represents dummies for four categories of firm 
size (i.e. total number of employees of 0-19 vs. 20-49 vs. 50-99 vs. 100 and above).  θi is 
an indicator for if an individual ever moves from one state of residence to another during 
the sample time period, and controls for unobservable characteristics of movers that 
might impact job tenure.  
  Each regression is weighted using NLSY79 sampling weights, and Huber-White 
robust standard errors are used to account for within-state error correlations.  In 
regressions using only data within industry subsamples, the indicators for workers’ 
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industry of primary employment κd, as well as the industry-specific yearly shocks δt x κd, 
are necessarily dropped.  In regressions using only data within demographic group 
subsamples, the vector of indicator variables for demographic characteristics of workers 
πj is necessarily dropped. 
Unconditional Quantile Regression  
In order to investigate the impact of wrongful discharge laws on the quantiles of 
the marginal distribution of weeks of job tenure, I employ unconditional quantile 
regression, as developed by Firpo et. al. (2009), using a recentered-influence function 
(hereafter RIF) of the outcome variable.  The RIF for the τth quantile, Qτ, is defined as: 
 𝑅𝐼𝐹 (𝑦
𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑓
, 𝑄𝜏) =  [𝑄𝜏  +
𝜏
𝑓(𝑄𝜏)
] −
1(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑓 < 𝑄𝜏)
𝑓(𝑄𝜏)
=  𝑘 𝜏 −   
1(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑓 < 𝑄𝜏)
𝑓(𝑄𝜏)
  
 
I estimate the following regression for every decile, 𝑄𝜏  = 0.10 to 𝑄𝜏 = 0.90, using the 
same difference in differences estimation methodology as employed for average effects 
in equation 1: 
RIF(yijstdf ,Qτ) = β1Treatst  + β2Postst + β3TreatstPostst + γs + δt + πj  
 
+ κd + δt x κd + λf + θi + β4 Postpostst + δt x Regiont + εijstdf    (2) 
 
Equation 2 is identical in all respects to equation 1, aside from the implementation of the 
RIF methodology on the dependent variable. Huber-White robust standard errors 
clustered at the state-level are used to account for within-state error correlations.  In 
regressions using data from demographic group subsamples, the vector of indicator 
variables for demographic characteristics of workers πj are necessarily dropped. In 
regressions using data from industry subsamples, the indicators for workers’ industry of 
primary employment κd, as well as the industry-specific yearly shocks δt x κd, are 
necessarily dropped. 
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OLS with Leads and Lags 
 
To give a picture of the dynamics effects of wrongful discharge doctrines on job 
tenure over the years leading up to and following policy adoption, I utilize this 
differences-in-differences regression with yearly leads and lags from two years before to 
two years after the year of adoption: 
yijstdf = ∑  2𝑚=−2 ηm Ls,t+m+ηp Ls,t≥3+γs +δt +πj+κd+δtxκd +  λf + θi + δt x Regions+ ԑijstdf     (3) 
 
All variables are the same as in equations 1, aside from the dummy variable Ls,t+m , that 
switches from zero to one only during the year of policy adoption, permitting estimation 
of the instantaneous policy effects.  Identification of ηm, the parameter of interest, comes 
from within region, within industry, within demographic group, within firm size, and 
within mover and nonmover category variation in weeks of job tenure between 
individuals in adopting versus nonadopting states over the year of policy adoption.  Ls,t≥3 
switches on from zero to one for all years beginning three years after policy adoption.  
The coefficient ηp controls for the enduring effect of policy adoption. 
In order to match the results for the full fixed effects regression, the overall 
sample window of adoptions analyzed is restricted to 1981 through 2011, ensuring the 
overall number of adoptions actually studied remains the same (i.e. implied contract 
doctrine by 36 states, the public policy doctrine by 36 states, and the good faith doctrine 
by 10 states).  The specification is weighted by NLSY79 yearly sample weights, and uses 
Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the state-level.  I focus this dynamic 
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analysis on all private-sector workers, and thus include all demographic and industry 
group control variables. 
Probit Model 
 
I use the following reduced form probit model, similar to that implemented in Kugler 
(2004): 
Pr(yijstdf ,γs,δt,πj,κd,λf,θi,δtxRegions)=Φ(β1 dst+γs+δt + πj + κd + λf + θi +δt x Regions)    (4) 
The dependent variable, yijstdf, represents the dichotomous outcomes measuring, 
respectively, whether a worker is employed in their primary job for at least three years, 
receives on-the-job training, and participates in on-the-job training for at least 40 hours 
per week.  This specification includes all of the same right-hand-side variables as 
equation 1 and 2, with the exception that the legal adoption variable, dst, captures the 
effect of each wrongful discharge law over the entire time period these policies remain in 
effect, representing in most cases the period from adoption until then end of the sample in 
2014.  In this instance, β1, the coefficient of interest, provides an estimate of the direct 
effect of wrongful discharge laws on the probability a worker participates in any training 
or training lasting at least 40 hours per week.  The specification is weighted by NLSY79 
sample weights, and uses Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the state-level.   
In regressions using data from demographic group subsamples, the vector of indicator 
variables for workers’ demographic characteristics πj is necessarily dropped. In 
regressions using data from industry subsamples, the indicators for workers’ industry of 
primary employment κd are necessarily dropped.  I am forced to exclude industry-specific 
national trends, δt x κd , as their inclusion limits data such that some probit analyses have 
insufficient observations. 
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Results 
Fixed Effects Difference in Differences Regression:  Ordinary Least Squares, 
Dynamics, and Unconditional Quantile Regression of Tenure 
Private-sector 
Tables 1 through 7 show the impact on the average and marginal distribution of 
weeks of job tenure for all private-sector workers and across major industry and 
demographic groups, using fixed effects difference in differences ordinary least squares 
and unconditional quantile regressions.  The first column of these tables shows the impact 
on average weeks of job tenure, while the second through ninth columns shows the 
distributional impact at each decile.  Importantly, all results in Tables C1 through C7 
show estimates of the impact on job tenure over the period from two years before to two 
years after the year of policy adoption.  Table C9 gives estimates of the longer-term 
impact on job tenure using all years of data when wrongful discharge policies are in 
place.  This distinction is important for the implied contract doctrine where the short-term 
effects, at least for those workers with lowest pre-adoption job tenure, are negative, but 
no statistically significant change occurs over the long-term.   
Table C1 illustrates the impact of wrongful discharge laws on weeks of job tenure 
for all private-sector workers.  Table C1 shows that the good faith doctrine increases 
weeks of job tenure for all private-sector workers by 31.11 percent on average, and 
increases the median by 33.29 percent to the top 80 percent of the marginal distribution 
of weeks of job tenure by 10.37 percent.  These results reflect the theoretical prediction 
that employment protection, by reducing flows into and out of employment, increases the 
duration of employment, especially for workers with greater pre-adoption attachment to 
 69 
the labor market.  Table C1 shows that the implied contract doctrine is associated with 
significant declines in average weeks of job tenure of 14.25 percent, and declines from 
the lowest decile of the marginal distribution of weeks of job tenure by 24.19 percent to 
the median by 9.43 percent.  These results suggest that, at least over the first years 
following adoption of the implied contract doctrine, workers that often leave the labor 
force have difficulty reentering employment at previous rates, and low-skill and low-
tenure workers that remain within their jobs experience a shortening of subsequent 
tenure.  Since the implied contract doctrine is associated with an increase in employers’ 
utilization of temp labor, the result of declining tenure might reflect increased 
competition with temps within the low-skill and low-tenure segment of the labor market. 
Nonmanufacturing 
Table C2 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on weeks of job tenure for 
private-sector nonmanufacturing workers.  Table C2 reveals that the good faith doctrine 
is associated with increases in average job tenure for private-sector nonmanufacturing 
workers by 46.88 percent, and increases from the bottom 40 percent of their marginal 
distribution of weeks of job tenure by 22.21 percent to the top 80 percent by 23.29 
percent.  The impact of the good faith doctrine is stronger for nonmanufacturing workers 
than for all private-sector workers.  Table C2 further demonstrates that the implied 
contract doctrine shortens job tenure, on average by 19.32 percent and from the bottom 
decile of the marginal distribution of private-sector nonmanufacturing workers’ weeks of 
job tenure by 23.75 percent to the median by 10.90 percent.   
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Manufacturing 
Table C3 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on private-sector 
manufacturing workers’ weeks of job tenure.  Table C3 reveals that the good faith 
doctrine in the case of private-sector manufacturing workers causes a marginally 
significant average decline in tenure of 50.95 percent, 65.66 percent for the bottom 30 
percent of the marginal distribution of weeks of job tenure, and similarly sized declines 
sporadically from the median to the top of the distribution.  One possible explanation for 
these results might be that private-sector manufacturing industry was the site of 
considerable expansion of temporary help service labor over these years. 
The implied contract doctrine has no significant impact on private-sector 
manufacturing workers’ average weeks of job tenure, significantly reduces the bottom 
decile by 31.13 percent, and raises the top 80 and 90 percent of their marginal 
distribution of job tenure by 14.00 and 9.87 percent, respectively.   I’ve found the implied 
contract doctrine also associated with increases in wages and union density for private-
sector manufacturing workers in my previous analysis.   My finding of increase at the top 
of the marginal distribution of private-sector manufacturing workers’ job tenure may 
reflect that unions are a labor market institution associated with increased job tenure for 
workers with high preexisting job tenure.  The decline at the lowest decile of weeks of 
job tenure following adoption of the implied contract doctrine might further reflect the 
role of increased competition with temp labor in shortening job duration among the low-
tenure and low-skill segment of the private-sector manufacturing workforce.  Table C3 
demonstrates a similar, if more condensed, result for public policy doctrine adoption, 
where lack of statistically significant change in average tenure masks a marginally 
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significant decline of 27.48 percent for the bottom 20 percent of the marginal distribution 
and significant increases in weeks of job tenure from the bottom 40 percent of 18.73 
percent to the top 60 percent of 15.64 percent. 
Male 
Table C4 shows the effect of wrongful discharge laws on weeks of job tenure for 
male private-sector workers.  While the implied contract and public policy doctrine have 
no significant effect on tenure, the good faith doctrine is associated with a marginally 
significant increase in average weeks of job tenure of 31.46 percent, and an increase from 
the top 60 percent of the marginal distribution of weeks of job tenure by 19.68 percent to 
the top 90 percent by 12.53 percent.  This result of increased duration of employment for 
male private-sector workers with higher pre-adoption job tenure is comparable to that 
found for wage impacts in Leonardi and Pica (2013), since workers with greater pre-
existing bargaining power, such as men, are relatively shielded from the negative 
consequences of employment protection. 
Female 
Table C5 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on female private-sector 
workers’ job tenure.  Similar to the case of male workers, the good faith doctrine has little 
significant effect on female private-sector workers’ average job tenure, but raises tenure 
from the median of their marginal distribution of weeks of job tenure by 51.36 percent to 
the top 70 percent by 18.97 percent. Unlike in the case of men, Table C5 illustrates that 
the implied contract doctrine significantly decreases average weeks of job tenure for 
female private-sector workers by 26.33 percent, driven by declines from the bottom 
decile of their marginal distribution of job tenure by 31.70 percent to the median by 14.51 
 72 
percent.  The implied contract doctrine, however, significantly increases female private-
sector workers’ weeks of job tenure at the top 90 percent of their marginal distribution of 
job tenure by 10.55 percent.  These results for the implied contract doctrine, aside from 
the very highest tenure female workers, buttresses the argument of Leonardi and Pica 
(2013), reflecting that women workers, overrepresented among the low-skilled and low-
tenured workforce in competition with temps, face the brunt of decline in job tenure. 
White 
Table C6 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on white private-sector 
workers’ job tenure.  The good faith doctrine increases average weeks of job tenure for 
white private-sector workers by 29.19 percent, and the top 60 and 70 percent of their 
marginal distribution of job tenure by 20.74 and 20.31 percent, respectively.  The implied 
contract doctrine is associated with declines in average weeks of job tenure for white 
private-sector workers of 16.00 percent, and from the lowest decile of the marginal 
distribution of job tenure by 27.75 percent to the median by 10.91 percent.  Despite 
having a bargaining power advantage compared to nonwhite workers, low-skilled and 
low-tenured white private-sector workers experience declines in employment duration 
likely reflecting increased competition with temp workers. 
Nonwhite 
Table C7 illustrates the impact of wrongful discharge laws on nonwhite private-
sector workers’ weeks of job tenure.  The good faith doctrine has no impact on average 
job tenure for nonwhite private-sector workers, but increases the bottom 30 percent of 
their marginal distribution of weeks of job tenure by 43.84 percent, and has a marginally 
significant positive effect on the median by 28.79 percent.  This result is striking as it is 
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the one instance where the increase in job tenure is greater for workers with lower pre-
adoption job tenure.  While the implied contract doctrine has no impact on nonwhite 
private-sector workers’ weeks of job tenure, the public policy doctrine is associated with 
a significant increase in the top 80 percent of their marginal distribution of job tenure by 
13.71 percent.  Overall, the results in Table C7 for nonwhite private-sector workers’ job 
tenure departs the most from the predictions of Leonardi and Pica (2013), since the 
persistence of employment discrimination against nonwhite workers suggests that their 
lower bargaining power would fuel declines in their job tenure.  One possible explanation 
for this result is that wrongful discharge laws may help nonwhite workers to challenge 
employment discrimination.  Case law provides many successful examples of nonwhite 
workers employing wrongful discharge laws in conjunction with antidiscrimination law.  
For instance, the case signaling adoption of the implied contract doctrine in Virginia, 
Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg (1983), concerns a worker who successfully sued on the 
grounds of his employer’s failure to follow through on oral promises and handbook 
provisions for just cause dismissal, as well as violation of Title VII Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 
Dynamic Effects 
Table C8 shows the dynamic effects, using equation 3 described above, of 
adoption of wrongful discharge laws on all private-sector workers’ average weeks of job 
tenure, evaluated over the same five years, from two before to two years after the year of 
policy adoption, as analyzed in the full fixed effects regressions using equations 1 and 2.  
This event study analysis permits a validity test of the two important assumptions 
underlying causality:  time order (i.e. the impact, if any, of policies on tenure occur only 
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after their adoption) and parallel trends (i.e. prior to adoption there is no significant 
difference in trends in job tenure between soon-to-adopt and non-adopting states).  The 
importance of the first assumption for causality is self-evident, since the impact of an 
event must occur only after the event takes place.  The second is important since causality 
rests on the notion that, without treatment (i.e. policy adoption), the pattern of change in 
the outcome variable in treatment and control groups would continue along the same path 
as prior to treatment.  This result is demonstrated in statistically insignificant coefficients 
on the indicators for two years and one year preceding adoption of each policy, and 
significant coefficients for the indicators representing the year of and years preceding 
policy adoption.  All yearly coefficients are evaluated relative to year t-3, just prior to the 
first pre-period year evaluated. 
Table C8 shows that while no single yearly effect is significant for the implied 
contract doctrine, the significant five-year results found in the full fixed effects regression 
may actually reflect the continuation of a pre-period trend between policy adopting and 
non-adopting states, as the decline in weeks of job tenure begins between two and one 
year before implied contract doctrine adoption. 
Although the public policy adoption does have a significant effect over the full 
five-year period, the yearly effects analysis shows significant increases of 11.29 percent 
and 12.50 percent in the year before and the year of policy adoption.  This finding casts 
doubt on a causal interpretation of the impact of public policy doctrine adoption on weeks 
of job tenure for all private-sector workers because a positive effect that begins prior to 
policy adoption might reflect omitted variables correlated with, but preceding and 
unrelated to, policy adoption, violating the requirements of time order and parallel trends.  
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The good faith doctrine, unlike the other wrongful discharge laws, upholds the 
assumptions of time order and parallel trends, since it shows no significant effect prior to 
policy adoption and large, growing, and in the case of two years following adoption, 
statistically significant, effects following policy adoption.   
Graphical illustration of event study 
Figure C1 presents a graphical representation of the dynamic effects of good faith 
doctrine adoption on weeks of job tenure for all private-sector workers given in the last 
column of Table C8.  While the pre-adoption trend ticks upward slightly one year prior to 
policy adoption, it is dwarfed by the large and persistent increase in weeks of job tenure 
in the first and second year following policy change, casting doubt that the pattern 
reflects mean reversion. 
Figure 2 presents a similar graphical image of the dynamic effects of adoption of 
the implied contract doctrine on private-sector workers’ average weeks of job tenure.  
One sees a general pattern of decline before policy adoption, with a stabilization 
occurring in the year of adoption, suggesting confounding pre-existing trends.  Figure 3 
depicts the dynamic effects of public policy doctrine adoption, revealing large pre-
adoption growth that stabilizes one year before policy change, but gradually declines to a 
pre-period level over the years following policy adoption.  This pattern of dynamic 
effects suggests confounding pre-existing effects and mean reversion. 
Probit Model:  Probability worker is employed in job for 3 or more years 
Table C9 depicts the impact of wrongful discharge laws on the probability a 
worker is employed in their primary job for at least three years, using the probit model 
given by equation 4.  The probit model uses all years of observations of the legal 
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adoption variables, giving the longer-term (i.e. beyond just two years following the year 
of policy adoption) impact of wrongful discharge laws.  Table C9 shows that the implied 
contract doctrine has no impact on the probability a worker is employed for at least three 
years in their primary job, and the public policy doctrine raises this likelihood by 4 
percent for all private-sector workers and by 3 percent for private-sector 
nonmanufacturing workers.  The good faith doctrine raises this likelihood by 7 percent 
for all private-sector workers and for private-sector nonmanufacturing workers.  Given 
the largely positive effects of the good faith doctrine on weeks of job tenure over the 
shorter-term, and the evidence in confirmation of parallel trends and causal time order for 
this policy, Table C9 provides further evidence that the good faith doctrine increases the 
amount of time workers remain in their jobs. 
Probit Model: Probability of training participation and intensity 
On-the-job training participation 
Table C10 shows the impact of wrongful discharge laws on the probability 
workers participate in any on-the-job training, in Panel A, and the probability workers 
participate in on-the-job training that requires a usual commitment of at least 40 hours per 
week, in Panel B.  Both analyses in Panels A and B utilize the probit model described in 
equation 3.  Panel A reveals that the good faith doctrine is associated with an increase in 
the likelihood of participation in any on-the-job training by 5 percent for all private-
sector workers and private-sector nonmanufacturing workers, though these effects are 
only marginally significant.  The good faith doctrine also significantly raises the 
probability that nonwhite private-sector workers participate in on-the-job training by 8 
percent.  This result indicates that increased tenure may permit, if not foster, increased 
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investment in the skill level of firms’ existing workforce.  The implied contract doctrine 
significantly increases the likelihood of participation in any on-the-job training among 
private-sector manufacturing workers by 7 percent, a result that appears to complement 
the previous finding in this analysis of no declines, and even marginally significant 
increases, in the top of the marginal distribution of private-sector manufacturing workers’ 
job tenure following implied contract doctrine adoption.   
On-the-job training intensity 
Panel B shows that the good faith doctrine increases the probability that on-the-
job training lasts at least 40 hours per week by 20 percent for all private-sector workers, 
by 29 percent for private-sector nonmanufacturing workers, by 32 percent for female 
private-sector workers, and by 19 percent for white private-sector workers.  These 
findings show that the longer tenure facilitated by the good faith doctrine does not simply 
promote superficial and easily acquired knacks, but is associated with time-consuming 
and valuable skill acquisition, particularly for women and nonmanufacturing workers 
who were historically excluded from extensive job training.  Unfortunately, as the sample 
size of workers participating in on-the-job training of at least 40 hours per week is 
smaller than the sample size of workers participating in any on-the-job training, 
insufficient observations exist for an analysis of the impact on the subsample of nonwhite 
private-sector workers.  Panel B shows no significant effects of the implied contract or 
public policy doctrines on the intensity of on-the-job training. 
Conclusion 
Firm productivity growth often hinges upon the effort and knowledge of 
production workers. Training and job tenure foster workers’ ability to accumulate and 
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share production knowledge with their employers.  The resulting increase in labor 
productivity, as shown in Autor et. al. (2007), makes possible growth in wages, either 
through neoclassical equivalence of wages with marginal productivity or through worker 
bargaining over a share of rising firm profits. The growth in income inequality over the 
past four decades in the United States is caused by stagnant real wage growth coupled 
with a doubling of productivity.  Meanwhile, job training and tenure have deteriorated.  
Wrongful discharge laws, and employment protection policies in general, can serve as a 
valuable means of countering the erosion of stable, skilled, and generously compensated 
employment, relinking growth in workers’ output and wages. 
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CONCLUSION 
Neoclassical theory argues that labor market flexibility creates the potential for 
tremendous growth by inducing workers to labor harder to avoid the costs of 
unemployment, providing firms with more output and higher revenue.  Recent research 
finds that at least one wrongful discharge law, the good faith doctrine, does raise labor 
productivity.  However, my results suggest that the good faith doctrine boosts labor 
productivity not by raising workers’ fear of unemployment, but rather by increasing firm 
investment in workers’ on-the-job training and through heightened learning-by-doing 
associated with longer job tenure.  My research also shows that these increases in tenure 
and training from the good faith doctrine are linked to significant wage gains.   
Much of growing income inequality in recent decades is based on the divergence 
of production workers’ wages and productivity, as CEOs and owners of capital have 
pocketed the difference in the form of skyrocketing bonuses and stock dividends.  If, as 
my results demonstrate, employment protection policies link wage and productivity 
growth, then they may a useful tool in promoting shared prosperity in labor markets. 
Given the fact that nearly all new employment since the Great Recession has been 
within the short-term, flexible, and “gig” sector, and that labor productivity growth has 
stagnated, particularly in manufacturing, since the Great Recession, the economy in 
recent years is something of a test case in the limitations of the neoclassical claim that 
labor market flexibility promotes growth.  Employment protection, on the other hand, can 
foster economic growth in two ways:  boosting workers purchasing power and promoting 
labor productivity growth through stable and skilled employment. 
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Social movements will always be the motor force preceding and prefiguring a 
revitalization of labors’ social and economic power, as illustrated by recent successful 
teacher strikes in West Virginia, Kentucky, and Arizona undertaken in the context of 
absence of legislation supporting public sector unions and collective bargaining.  
However, policies that are the sediment of past victories such as employment protection 
can facilitate future gains by providing a more favorable starting position for the labor 
movement.  For instance, after the first wave of successful organizing drives during the 
early Great Depression, unions benefited from the pro-labor New Deal legislation such as 
the Wagner Act that emerged to codify their membership gains.  Specifically, these laws 
helped unions to overcome free-riding and employer repression in subsequent organizing.  
The Taft Hartley Act, passed in the immediate post-World War II years, reflected and 
furthered the first coordinated and successful effort of employers to turn back the tide of 
growing union membership and power.  The Employee Free Choice Act proposed in 
Obama’s first administration sought to overturn these Taft Hartley rules.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Janus v. AFSCME (2018) contributes significantly to 
the continued weakening of unions and efforts to protect worker rights.  In this context, 
wrongful discharge laws are even more critical as means to counteract the pressures 
undermining unions, wages, and stable and skilled employment, making analysis of this 
topic timely and policy-relevant.  Employment protection is a vital tool in promoting the 
stability and confidence workers need to once again assert their voice within the 
workplace 
.  
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APPENDIX A   
FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER 1 
 
Figure A1 --- The General Structure of State Judicial Branches 
 
 
Note:  Author’s analysis of institutional literature on state judicial systems. 
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Figure A2 --- Maps of Wrongful Discharge Law Recognition as of December 2014 
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Table A1 --- Recognition of Wrongful Discharge Laws by State as of December 31, 2014 
and Closest Calendar Year to Date of Policy Adoption and Repeal  
State Implied Contact 
Y/N       Adopt       Repeal 
Public Policy          
Y/N      Adopt        Repeal 
Good Faith  
Y/N   Adopt   Repeal   
Readopt 
 
Alabama…………………. 
Alaska…………………..... 
Arizona………………….. 
Arkansas…………………. 
California………………… 
Colorado………………… 
Connecticut…………….... 
Delaware…………………. 
Florida…………………… 
Georgia………………….. 
Hawaii…………………... 
Idaho…………………….. 
Illinois…………………… 
Indiana………………….. 
Iowa……………………… 
Kansas…………………… 
Kentucky………………… 
Louisiana………………… 
Maine……………………. 
Maryland………………… 
Massachusetts……………. 
Michigan…………………. 
Minnesota………………… 
Mississippi……………….. 
Missouri…………………. 
Montana………………….. 
Nebraska…………………. 
Nevada…………………… 
New Hampshire………….. 
New Jersey………………. 
New Mexico……………… 
New York………………… 
North Carolina…………… 
North Dakota…………….. 
Ohio……………………… 
Oklahoma………………… 
Oregon…………………… 
Pennsylvania…………….. 
Rhode Island……………… 
South Carolina…………… 
South Dakota…………….. 
Tennessee………………… 
Texas…………………….. 
Utah………………………. 
Vermont………………….. 
Virginia…………………… 
Washington………………. 
West Virginia……………... 
Wisconsin………………… 
Wyoming…………………. 
 
Total 
 
Y           1988                    
Y           1983               
Y           1983                     
Y           1984                  
Y           1972                     
Y           1984                     
Y           1986                  
N                           
N                   
N                   
Y           1987                     
Y           1977                     
Y           1975                  
Y           1988                  
Y           1988                  
Y           1985                     
Y           1984               
N                            
Y           1978                  
Y           1985                  
Y           1988                  
Y           1980                  
Y           1983                  
Y           1992                  
N           1983          1988        
Y           1987                     
Y           1984                  
Y           1984                     
Y           1989                  
Y           1985                  
Y           1980                     
Y           1983                  
N                                        
Y           1984                  
Y           1982                  
Y           1977                  
Y           1978                     
N                           
N                            
Y           1987                  
Y           1983                  
Y           1982                  
Y           1985                     
Y           1986                
Y           1986                  
Y           1984                     
Y           1978               
Y           1986                     
Y           1985            
Y           1986                           
 
42        43           1             
 
N                            
Y           1986                     
Y           1985                     
Y           1980                  
Y           1960                     
Y           1986                     
Y           1980                  
Y           1992                  
N                            
N                            
Y           1983                     
Y           1977                     
Y           1979                  
Y           1973                  
Y           1986                  
Y           1981                     
Y           1984               
N                            
N 
Y           1982                  
Y           1980                  
Y           1976                  
Y           1987                  
Y           1988                  
Y           1986                  
Y           1980                     
Y           1988                     
Y           1984                  
Y           1974                  
Y           1981                  
Y           1984                     
N                   
Y           1985                  
Y           1988                  
Y           1990                  
Y           1989                  
Y           1975                     
Y           1974                  
N                            
Y           1986                  
Y           1989                  
Y           1985                  
Y           1984                     
Y           1989                
Y           1987                  
Y           1985                     
Y           1985               
Y           1979                     
Y           1980            
Y           1990                          
 
43        43          0 
 
N                            
Y       1983                          
Y       1985                          
N                            
Y       1981                          
N                                        
Y       1980                  
Y       1992                  
N                            
N                       
N                           
Y       1990                          
N                            
N                            
N                            
N                            
N                            
N                                        
N                            
N                           
Y       1978                  
N                                        
N                     
N 
N                                        
Y       1982                  
N                                        
Y       1987                  
Y       1974    1981    1990        
N                   
N                                        
N                   
N                                         
N                           
N                            
N       1985    1989        
N                            
N                            
N            
N                                         
N                          
N                                        
N                                    
N                                        
N                           
N                          
N                        
N                            
N                            
Y       1994                       
 
11     12       2      1 
Notes:  Based on author’s analysis of case law and secondary literature.  “Y” denotes that a policy is recognized and “N” denotes that it is not recognized by a state as of December 
31, 2014.  Adoptions and repeal dates are rounded to the calendar year in which they occurred if the first full month following policy change was from January to May of that year, 
and are rounded forward to the following calendar year if the first full month following policy change is from June to December of the original year. 
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Table A2 --- Simplified Illustration of the Legal Policy Variables for the Full Fixed Effects 
Differences in Differences Regression Using the Adoption of the Implied Contract Doctrine 
in Massachusetts in 1988 for Treatment Observations and Rhode Island and Maine for 
Control Observations  
 
Panel A. --- Massachusetts (Adopts the Implied Contract Doctrine in 1988)       
                 
Legal Policy 
Variables 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
 Treatst 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
 Postst 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 Treatst Postst 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
 Postpostst 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 
Panel B. --- Rhode Island (Never Adopts A Wrongful Discharge Doctrine) 
                       
Legal Policy 
Variables 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
 Treatst 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Postst 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 Treatst Postst 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Postpostst 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Panel C. --- Maine (Only Adopted the Implied Contract Doctrine in 1978) 
                       
Legal Policy 
Variables 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
 Treatst 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Postst 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 Treatst Postst 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Postpostst 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note:  Constructed from author’s analysis of Autor et. al. (2006).  Treatst  is an indicator for the period 2 years before to 2 years after 
the year of adoption of a wrongful-discharge law in treatment state s.  Postst is an indicator for the period from the year of adoption to 
2 years after the year of adoption for all states, both adopting and nonadopting.  TreatstPostst  is an interaction term representing the 
three-year period following policy adoption, in the treatment state only, beginning with the first year of adoption. The coefficient of 
interest β2 is an estimate of the pre-post change in the union outcome variable in adopting states relative to the corresponding change 
in non-adopting states.  Postpostst  is a dummy variable that turns on for each state that reenters the control group 3 years after the year 
of policy adoption to account for any bias caused by the enduring effect of the policy adoption after the five-year treatment window 
expires.    
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Table A3 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on State Union Membership and 
Coverage Outcomes by Sector:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding Adoption, 
1983-2014 
                    A. Membership Rates                  B. Membership Levels              C.  Nonmembership Levels 
                  All    Manuf.      Nonman.     All       Manuf.      Nonman.   All          Manuf.  Nonman.                               
Doctrines (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Implied  
Contract 
0.83** 
   (0.28) 
 1.35* 
(0.64) 
   0.52** 
     (0.18) 
    4.94 
   (3.28) 
7.90* 
(3.51) 
2.90 
(3.57) 
-1.19 
(1.80) 
-0.44 
(2.46) 
-1.43 
(1.79) 
    N  454   454   454  
 
Public  0.02    -0.84     0.20 -3.46   -5.37     -0.88     -1.89   0.41   -2.30 
Policy (0.26)    (0.75)     (0.20) (3.73)    (4.97)      (3.92)      (1.84)   (2.46)   (2.20) 
    N     416       416      416  
 
Good  0.18     -1.62*         0.41 -8.52   -14.1***      -5.18     -5.42   2.92   -6.93 
Faith (0.37)     (0.70)        (0.31) (5.71)     (3.63)       (6.34)      (4.72)   (5.10)   (4.95) 
    N      437       437     437  
 
                              D.  Coverage Rates                E. Coverage Levels                  F. Noncoverage Levels                                            
Implied  1.01**     1.62*   0.71**   6.23+   9.07*   4.76   -1.43 -0.85 -1.64 
Contract    (0.33)     (0.70) (0.21)   (3.26)   (3.46)    (3.38)   (1.82) (2.56) (1.80) 
    N       454     454   454  
       
Public  0.22   -0.47   0.36  -1.38     -2.37        0.77       -2.13   -0.09  -2.49 
Policy (0.30)    (0.80)   (0.21)   (3.51)       (4.45)        (3.52)       (1.85)   (2.48)  (2.19) 
    N    416         416     416  
 
Good  -0.00    -1.79+    0.17    -10.16+     -10.8**       -9.04      -5.25   3.27  -6.70 
Faith (0.41)    (0.92)    (0.42)    (6.00)      (3.85)        (7.48)       (4.72)   (4.92)  (4.99) 
    N     437         437     437  
Note:  Each entry shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 100 times the number of 
employed private-sector  wage and salary workers between 16 and 64 years of age in a given sector who are union members or covered by collective bargaining agreements over all employed private-
sector  wage and salary workers between the ages of 16 and 64 in a given sector, or 100 times the natural logarithm of the number of employed private-sector  wage and salary workers between the ages 
of 16 and 64 in a given sector who are/aren’t union members or are/aren’t covered by collective bargaining agreements in a given sector in 50 U.S. states.  The number of union members, covered 
workers, nonmembers, noncovered workers, and total private-sector  wage and salary workers in a given sector is constructed from Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group monthly 
earnings files for the years 1983 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year 
dummies.  Models are weighted using CPS earnings weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states
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Table A4 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on State Union Membership and Coverage 
Outcomes by Gender and Age:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding Adoption, 
1983-2014 
Panel A.--- Membership Rates     Panel B.--- Coverage Rates                  
                         M.Y.          M.O.            F.Y.      F.O.          M.Y.  M.O.       F.Y.            F.O. 
Doctrines (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Implied 1.38** 0.53 0.52+ 0.49 1.47** 0.67 0.77** 0.81 
Contract (0.44) (0.66) (0.27) (0.59) (0.51) (0.65) (0.27) (0.63) 
     N    454     
Public  0.18 -0.60 0.17 0.05 0.30 -0.40 0.55+ 0.10 
Policy (0.51) (0.54) (0.26) (0.53) (0.56) (0.58) (0.29) (0.58) 
     N    416     
Good 0.51 1.01 -0.19 -0.89 0.35 0.64 -0.30 -0.92 
Faith (0.64)   (1.65)     (0.47)    (0.82) (0.69) (1.34) (0.36) (0.90) 
    N    437     
 
     Panel C. --- Membership  Levels  Panel D. --- Coverage  Levels 
Implied  9.53* 2.01 4.50 -6.00 9.62* 2.77 7.47 -0.93 
Contract (4.21) (3.82) (6.32) (8.10) (4.32) (3.61) (5.25) (6.92) 
   N    454     
Public  -3.26 -3.67 -6.19   -0.80 -1.88   -3.07    1.22 -0.77 
Policy     (5.82)   (4.14)    (5.46)    (8.55)    (4.89)    (4.41)    (4.86)   (7.36) 
    N    416     
Good -11.96   9.63   -24.21**   -27.94 -13.59   5.79 -23.5*** -22.76 
Faith   (11.14)    (6.49)       (7.74)     (19.54)    (10.9)    (3.91)    (7.46)   (16.33) 
     N      437     
  Panel E. --- Nonmembership Levels    Panel F. --- Noncoverage Levels          
Implied  -1.24 -1.08 -0.37 -3.09+ -1.39 -1.30 -0.65 -3.47+ 
Contract (2.39) (2.11) (2.00) (1.81) (2.40) (2.15) (1.99) (1.83) 
      N    454     
Public   -2.85   -0.17 -1.33   -1.76 -2.98    -0.49 -1.73 -1.82 
Policy    (2.24)    (1.83)    (2.17)     (2.42)    (2.29)     (1.80)    (2.16)   (2.41) 
      N       416     
Good -9.37     0.68      -5.29     -1.18 -9.23    1.08   -5.18 -1.16 
Faith  (6.35)     (5.98)       (3.92)      (5.02)    (6.40)     (5.60)    (3.95)   (4.83) 
      N        437     
 
 
Note:  Each entry shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression defined as in the note to Table A3, but based upon 
the following four age-sex demographic category subsamples of total private-sector  wage and salary employees:  MY=males between the ages of 16 and 39, MO=males between the ages of 
40 and 64, and FY=females between the ages of 16 and 39, FO=females between the ages of 40 and 64.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, as 
well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using CPS earnings weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to 
allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.   
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Table A5 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on State Union Membership and Coverage 
Outcomes by Sector, Gender, and Age:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding 
Adoption, 1983-2014 
 
Panel A.--- Membership Rates       
                        Total       Manufact.    Nonman.        M.Y.        M.O.           F.Y.      F.O. 
Doctrines (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Implied 0.65** 1.45* 0.33 0.61+ 0.62 0.50* -0.26 
Contract (0.23) (0.56) (0.20) (0.35) (0.55) (0.24) (0.53) 
     N    454    
Public  -0.02 -1.04 0.36 0.08 -0.55 0.18 -0.62 
Policy (0.28) (0.74) (0.23) (0.42) (0.44) (0.25) (0.41) 
     N    416    
Good -1.83*** -3.47*** 0.47 -1.36* -0.64 -0.33 -0.40 
Faith (0.34)   (0.69)     (0.29)    (0.65) (1.10) (0.46) (0.95) 
    N    437    
   
Panel B.--- Coverage Rates       
Implied  0.53* 1.47** 0.48** 0.43 0.67 0.77** 0.01 
Contract (0.24) (0.52) (0.17) (0.36) (0.57) (0.23) (0.53) 
   N    454    
Public  0.21 -1.08 0.45+   0.62   -0.33   0.56+    0.09 
Policy     (0.33)   (0.75)    (0.23)    (0.72)    (0.53)    (0.31)    (0.48) 
    N      416    
Good -2.31***   -4.6***   -0.19   -1.66+   -1.26   -0.43 -1.82 
Faith   (7.07)    (1.27)       (0.36)     (0.90)    (1.06)    (0.43)    (1.21) 
     N      437    
   
 
Note:  Each entry shows output from analysis using equation 2, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression defined as in the note to Table A3, but based upon 
the following sector-specific and age-sex demographic category subsamples of total private-sector  wage and salary employees:  Total = all private-sector  wage and salary workers, Manuf = 
manufacturing industry workers, Nonman. = Nonmanufacturing industry workers, MY=males between the ages of 16 and 39, MO=males between the ages of 40 and 64, and FY=females 
between the ages of 16 and 39, FO=females between the ages of 40 and 64.  All models include an interactive fixed effects term based on state main effects and indicators for each year in the 
sample.  All models also include interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using CPS earnings weights.  Huber-White robust 
standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.   
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Table A6 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on Manufacturing Union 
Membership Rates:  Dynamic Effects from 2 Years Preceding Adoption to 2 Years Following Adoption, 1983-2014 
 
     OLS,          OLS,           OLS 
          Reg-Yr FE      Reg-Yr FE       Reg-Yr FE, 
Implied           State-Yr       Public     State-Yr    Good       State-Yr 
Contract IFE  Policy IFE  Faith IFE 
IC t-2 0.26  PP t-2 -0.31  GF t-2 1.66 
 (0.82)   (0.57)   (1.16) 
IC t-1 -0.25  PP t-1 0.36  GF t-1 1.85 
 (0.90)   (0.74)   (1.85) 
IC 0.98  PP 0.64  GF 0.13 
 (0.92)   (0.61)   (1.14) 
IC t+1 1.18+  PP t+1 -0.08  GF t+1 -0.70 
 (0.69)   (0.76)   (1.35) 
IC t+2 0.76  PP t+2 -0.37  GF t+2 -0.08 
 (0.68)   (0.69)   (1.22) 
IC Lag t+3 0.48  PP Lag t+3 0.63  GF Lag t+3 -0.34 
 (0.57)   (0.63)   (0.75) 
Adj. R-Sq    0.17    
N    1,550    
Note:  Each entry  shows analysis using equation 3, a weighted OLS baseline difference and differences regression with two years of leads and lags in which all yearly coefficients, γτ, are 
evaluated relative to year t-3, just prior to the first pre-period year evaluated.  The dependent variable is 100 times the natural logarithm of the number of employed private-sector  wage and 
salary workers between 16 and 64 years of age in manufacturing industry who are union members over all employed private-sector  wage and salary workers between the ages of 16 and 64 in 
manufacturing industry in 50 U.S. states.  The number of union members and total private-sector  wage and salary workers in manufacturing industry is constructed from Current Population 
Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group monthly earnings files for the years 1983 to 2014.  All models include an interactive fixed effects term based on state main effects and indicators for 
each year in the sample.  All models also include interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using CPS earnings weights.  Huber-
White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.   
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Figure A3 --- Union Membership Rates for Manufacturing Workers Before and After Adoption of the Implied Contract 
Doctrine:  Yearly Leads From 2 Years Before to 2 Years After Adoption, 1983-2014 
 
100 x (Members/Employment) 
 
Note: The figure shows analysis of the impact of the implied contract doctrine on state union membership rates using equation 3, a weighted OLS difference and differences regression with 
two years of leads and lags in which all yearly coefficients, γτ, are evaluated relative to year t-3, just prior to the first pre-period year evaluated.  The dependent variable is 100 times the 
natural logarithm of the number of employed private-sector  wage and salary workers between 16 and 64 years of age in manufacturing industry who are union members over all employed 
private-sector  wage and salary workers between the ages of 16 and 64 in manufacturing industry in 50 U.S. states.  The number of union members and total private-sector  wage and salary 
workers in manufacturing industry is constructed from Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group monthly earnings files for the years 1983 to 2014.  This specification 
includes an interactive fixed effects term based on state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample.  The model also include interactions between four Census-region dummies and 
calendar year dummies.  It is weighted using CPS earnings weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.  
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APPENDIX B   
FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Table B1 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding Adoption, 1979-
2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 1.74 3.13 2.44 -0.25 1.64 -0.21 -0.33 -1.55 -1.10 -1.23 
Contract (1.56) (2.73) (2.62) (1.54) (1.76) (1.98) (2.03) (2.26) (2.12) (3.98) 
R-Sq 0.76 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.12 
N 52,491 52,491 52,491 52,491 52,491 52,491 52,491 52,491 52,491 52,491 
 
Public     2.32 0.41 0.97 3.04 2.34 2.41 3.44 3.42 8.73* 5.29 
Policy    (2.76) (2.01) (2.16) (2.61) (1.89) (2.02) (2.28) (2.71) (4.04) (3.96) 
R-Sq     0.75 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.12 
N  54,797 54,797 54,797 54,797 54,797 54,797 54,797 54,797 54,797 54,797 
 
Good   18.6*** 1.84 9.00** 7.52+ 16.51*** 21.07*** 23.7** 24.26** 20.49* 30.20*** 
Faith   (4.62) (3.25) (2.65) (3.93) (4.01) (5.69) (7.26) (7.18) (7.69) (7.81) 
R-Sq    0.75  0.08 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.12 
N  54,185 54,185 54,185 54,185 54,185 54,185 54,185 54,185 54,185 54,185 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output from 
analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the natural 
logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages are taken from National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, 
demographics, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are 
weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table B2 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings for Female Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 
Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 0.39 5.57* 1.52 1.47 0.27 2.96 0.53 0.11 -1.53 -1.62 
Contract (2.09) (2.43) (2.03) (2.12) (2.18) (1.92) (2.93) (2.36) (3.40) (4.41) 
R-Sq 0.75 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.05 
N 24,531 24,531 24,531 24,531 24,531 24,531 24,531 24,531 24,531 24,531 
 
Public 2.75 -1.35 1.46 3.15 4.74 1.92 1.62 2.87 4.90 11.87* 
Policy (4.41) (3.31) (2.47) (2.49) (3.00) (3.14) (2.98) (3.99) (4.31) (4.54) 
R-Sq 0.74 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.05 
N 23,080 23,080 23,080 23,080 23,080 23,080 23,080 23,080 23,080 23,080 
 
Good 21.68*** 13.06** 9.50* 15.10** 11.95* 20.02** 27.82*** 27.47* 34.92** 34.51*** 
Faith (5.50) (4.46) (3.63) (5.10) (5.44) (6.19) (7.17) (10.58) (11.27) (8.26) 
R-Sq 0.74 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.05 
N 22,607 22,607 22,607 22,607 22,607 22,607 22,607 22,607 22,607 22,607 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of female private-sector  wage and salary employees in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output 
from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the 
natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of female private-sector  wage and salary employees in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages are taken from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ 
industry, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are 
weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table B3 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings for Male Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 
Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 3.38+ 2.63 0.51 -1.50 0.65 0.74 -1.13 -1.98 0.34 1.83 
Contract (1.81) (3.48) (3.84) (2.80) (2.83) (2.72) (2.28) (2.17) (2.25) (3.14) 
R-Sq 0.75 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.04 
N 28,246 28,246 28,246 28,246 28,246 28,246 28,246 28,246 28,246 28,246 
 
Public 0.83 -2.48 1.73 2.82 2.45 4.73 2.20 5.22 7.22+ 2.34 
Policy (2.89) (3.43) (3.61) (3.19) (2.95) (2.82) (2.92) (4.04) (4.19) (5.32) 
R-Sq 0.74 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.05 
N 29,570 29,570 29,570 29,570 29,570 29,570 29,570 29,570 29,570 29,570 
 
Good 13.75* -11.66* 3.06 10.15* 16.63** 21.07** 17.76** 12.49+ 26.33** 24.35*** 
Faith (5.66) (5.03) (5.14) (4.26) (5.44) (6.11) (6.56) (7.29) (8.45) (4.82) 
R-Sq 0.74 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.05 
N 29,384 29,384 29,384 29,384 29,384 29,384 29,384 29,384 29,384 29,384 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of male private-sector  wage and salary employees in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output 
from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the 
natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of male private-sector  wage and salary employees in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages are taken from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ 
industry, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are 
weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table B4 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings for White Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 
Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 1.80 1.29 -2.15 0.09 2.06 0.12 0.74 -0.27 0.51 -1.25 
Contract (2.04) (1.78) (2.92) (2.91) (3.06) (3.19) (3.06) (3.33) (3.78) (4.25) 
R-Sq 0.76 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.05 
N 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 
 
Public 1.43 -0.67 -0.28 1.13 3.57 3.04 1.97 5.47 6.41 2.58 
Policy (3.11) (2.84) (2.66) (3.40) (3.12) (3.11) (3.42) (4.03) (4.04) (4.80) 
R-Sq 0.76 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.05 
N 28,949 28,949 28,949 28,949 28,949 28,949 28,949 28,949 28,949 28,949 
 
Good 21.04*** 2.16 11.41* 10.17+ 21.40*** 23.67* 20.56* 22.57* 28.29** 34.20*** 
Faith (5.23) (3.70) (4.88) (5.57) (5.94) (8.90) (10.07) (9.99) (9.66) (9.32) 
R-Sq 0.75 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.05 
N 30,533 30,533 30,533 30,533 30,533 30,533 30,533 30,533 30,533 30,533 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of white private-sector  wage and salary employees in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output 
from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the 
natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of white private-sector  wage and salary employees in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages are taken from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ 
industry, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are 
weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table B5 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings for Nonwhite Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 
Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 3.78+ 4.25 6.47+ 6.17* 0.39 2.72 0.64 0.59 -2.17 -0.33 
Contract (2.00) (3.51) (3.33) (3.06) (2.55) (2.66) (2.34) (1.84) (2.35) (2.86) 
R-Sq 0.72 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.04 
N 22,834 22,834 22,834 22,834 22,834 22,834 22,834 22,834 22,834 22,834 
 
Public 4.77* 7.05** 4.36 6.55* 3.63+ 0.17 1.52 3.61 3.24 13.66* 
Policy (1.90) (2.56) (2.99) (2.44) (2.13) (2.03) (2.26) (2.79) (4.19) (6.60) 
R-Sq 0.71 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 
N 23,267 23,267 23,267 23,267 23,267 23,267 23,267 23,267 23,267 23,267 
 
Good 12.97** -3.94** 0.39 13.13* 13.76* 15.77* 27.44*** 28.77*** 30.60*** 37.70* 
Faith (4.76) (1.42) (3.70) (6.29) (5.92) (6.40) (7.76) (8.05) (7.53) (14.89) 
R-Sq 0.72 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.05 
N 21,372 21,372 21,372 21,372 21,372 21,372 21,372 21,372 21,372 21,372 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of nonwhite private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows 
output from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times 
the natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of nonwhite private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages are taken from 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for 
individuals’ industry, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  
Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table B6 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings for Nonmanufacturing Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 
and 2 Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 1.04 0.88 0.43 -2.34 -3.65* -2.50 -1.93 -2.94 -3.32 -1.57 
Contract (1.92) (1.84) (1.99) (1.48) (1.43) (2.13) (2.39) (2.39) (2.70) (4.10) 
R-Sq 0.76 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.08 
N 40,629 40,629 40,629 40,629 40,629 40,629 40,629 40,629 40,629 40,629 
 
Public 2.74 1.31 0.82 4.62+ 3.35 3.65 4.59 4.25 7.85+ 6.06 
Policy (2.97) (2.24) (1.88) (2.41) (2.69) (2.45) (2.98) (3.35) (4.04) (4.13) 
R-Sq 0.75 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.09 
N 42,388 42,388 42,388 42,388 42,388 42,388 42,388 42,388 42,388 42,388 
 
Good 17.18** 3.74 5.77* 14.84** 20.17*** 24.05*** 24.91** 27.28** 16.93* 28.16** 
Faith (5.75) (2.94) (2.80) (4.82) (5.57) (6.42) (8.31) (8.14) (8.27) (8.53) 
R-Sq 0.75 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.09 
N 42,059 42,059 42,059 42,059 42,059 42,059 42,059 42,059 42,059 42,059 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private  wage and salary employees in nonmanufacturing industries in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 
9 shows output from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 
100 times the natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in nonmanufacturing industries in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. year 2000 
hourly wages are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the 
sample, indicators for individuals’ demographics, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and 
calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations 
within states. 
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Table B7 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings for Manufacturing Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 
Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 4.77* 4.99 3.27 7.23+ 7.78*** 3.48 0.96 1.91 2.67 -4.15 
Contract 
R-Sq 
(1.98) 
0.88 
(5.99) 
0.08 
(4.68) 
0.13 
(3.89) 
0.17 
(2.02) 
0.19 
(3.10) 
0.20 
(2.83) 
0.20 
(2.48) 
0.22 
(2.40) 
0.21 
(3.04) 
0.18 
N 11,482 11,482 11,482 11,482 11,482 11,482 11,482 11,482 11,482 11,482 
 
Public 2.51 -5.18 0.98 -0.77 -1.29 2.13 2.44 5.36+ 8.20* 0.90 
Policy (1.71) (3.53) (3.51) (3.21) (3.63) (3.65) (4.06) (3.09) (4.01) (4.25) 
R-Sq 0.88 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 
N 10,854 10,854 10,854 10,854 10,854 10,854 10,854 10,854 10,854 10,854 
 
Good 10.95+ -11.44+ -9.51* -3.33 7.21 9.74 3.60 -2.11 14.78* 26.84** 
Faith (5.80) (5.99) (4.71) (5.67) (7.15) (6.59) (7.28) (8.31) (6.46) (9.15) 
R-Sq 0.89 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.18 
N 9,438 9,438 9,438 9,438 9,438 9,438 9,438 9,438 9,438 9,438 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in manufacturing industry in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 
through 9 shows output from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence 
function of 100 times the natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in manufacturing industry in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. year 
2000 hourly wages are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in 
the sample, indicators for individuals’ demographics, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and 
calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations 
within states. 
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Figure B1 --- Real Hourly Earnings for Manufacturing Workers Before and After Adoption of the Implied Contract Doctrine:  
Yearly Leads From 2 Years Before to 3 Years After Adoption, 1979-2014 
 
100 x ln(Real Hourly Wage) 
 
 
Note:  The figure shows dynamic effect of the good faith doctrine on the fourth decile of wages using equation 3, which is a difference and differences unconditional quantile regression with 
two years of leads and lags in which all yearly coefficients, ηm, are evaluated relative to year t-3, just prior to the first pre-period year evaluated.  The dependent variable is 100 times the 
natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in manufacturing industries in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages are 
taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators 
for individuals’ demographics, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year 
dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table B8 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings for Communication Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 
2 Preceding Adoption, 1979-2013 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 1.27 -4.00+ -0.08 0.11 0.33 -0.63 -0.54 -0.16 1.48 4.18* 
Contract (1.61) (2.20) (2.23) (2.11) (1.49) (1.37) (1.50) (1.32) (1.60) (1.74) 
R-Sq 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 
N 29,595 29,595 29,595 29,595 29,595 29,595 29,595 29,595 29,595 29,595 
 
Public 0.27 2.77 -1.01 -1.58 -3.21+ -1.28 -2.60 -0.27 -0.67 -1.69 
Policy (1.39) (2.98) (3.22) (2.44) (1.79) (1.42) (1.70) (1.74) (1.74) (3.08) 
R-Sq 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 
N 28,135 28,135 28,135 28,135 28,135 28,135 28,135 28,135 28,135 28,135 
 
Good 5.09** 2.76 2.11 10.09* 6.11* 4.15* 7.64** 0.10 4.06 8.80* 
Faith (1.48) (4.46) (2.70) (4.31) (2.81) (1.65) (2.32) (1.93) (2.48) (3.97) 
R-Sq 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.08 
N 26,179 26,179 26,179 26,179 26,179 26,179 26,179 26,179 26,179 26,179 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in the communication industry in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 
through 9 shows output from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence 
function of 100 times the natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in the communication industry in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. 
year 2000 hourly wages are taken from Current Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group files for the years 1979 to 2013.  All models include state main effects and indicators 
for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ demographics, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using 
CPS earnings weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table B9 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of State Real 
Hourly Earnings for Transportation Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 
Preceding Adoption, 1979-2013 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 2.42+ 3.48+ 2.44 2.15 3.61* 3.86** 3.99** 2.24+ 1.79+ 1.27 
Contract (1.22) (1.78) (1.46) (1.61) (1.39) (1.43) (1.15) (1.23) (1.06) (1.68) 
R-Sq 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 
N 66,632 66,632 66,632 66,632 66,632 66,632 66,632 66,632 66,632 66,632 
 
Public -0.24 -0.22 1.04 1.20 1.21 0.63 -0.71 -1.98 -2.44+ -3.81 
Policy (1.48) (1.84) (1.56) (1.60) (1.74) (1.73) (1.54) (1.35) (1.24) (2.48) 
R-Sq 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 
N 68,418 68,418 68,418 68,418 68,418 68,418 68,418 68,418 68,418 68,418 
 
Good 4.06* 1.92 2.56 3.37 5.47** 5.93* 6.12** 3.85* 3.76 -0.65 
Faith (1.74) (2.12) (1.79) (2.68) (1.71) (2.35) (2.28) (1.87) (3.13) (3.96) 
R-Sq 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 
N 65,756 65,756 65,756 65,756 65,756 65,756 65,756 65,756 65,756 65,756 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in the transportation industry in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 
through 9 shows output from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence 
function of 100 times the natural logarithm of real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages of private-sector  wage and salary employees in the transportation industry in 50 U.S. states.  The real U.S. 
year 2000 hourly wages are taken from Current Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group files for the years 1979 to 2013.  All models include state main effects and indicators 
for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ demographics, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using 
CPS earnings weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table B10 --- Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Probability Women Are Low-Wage Workers, 1979-
2014 
 
Family of Two,  
100% Federal Poverty 
Level 
Family of Three, 
125% Federal Poverty 
Level 
Implied Contract 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Public Policy -0.04** -0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Good Faith -0.05* -0.07* 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.16 0.16 
N 49,263 49,263 
Note:  Each entry in columns 1 and 2 shows output from analysis using equation 4, which is a difference and differences probit model, in which the dependent variable is, respectively, a 
dummy that indicates if female private-sector  wage and salary employees in 50 U.S. states are paid, respectively, a wage less than or equal to an amount sufficient to bring a family of two 
(i.e. one parent and one child) a yearly income equivalent to the fedral poverty level, or a wage less than or equal to an amount sufficient to bring a family of three (i.e one parent and two 
children) a yearly income equivalent to 125% of the federal poverty level. These dichotomous dependent variables are constructed from the data in National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 on family size, number of children, as well as the real U.S. year 2000 hourly wages described previously, for the years 1979 through 2014.  All models include state main effects and 
indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, the size of the firm they work in, if they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-
region dummies and calendar year dummies..  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations 
across observations within states. 
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APPENDIX C 
  FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Table C1 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of Weeks of 
Job Tenure:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied -14.25** -24.19* -28.3*** -19.11** -9.99* -9.43+ -4.26 -3.41 -0.99 4.55 
Contract (5.27) (9.79) (8.00) (5.70) (4.40) (4.74) (3.16) (3.06) (2.58) (3.01) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.07 
N 53,713 53,713 53,713 53,713 53,713 53,713 53,713 53,713 53,713 53,713 
 
Public -0.06 -15.11+ -10.57 -1.44 -2.41 3.13 4.74 3.86 3.56 3.17 
Policy (5.07) (8.95) (9.04) (5.46) (3.45) (6.08) (5.81) (4.37) (3.93) (3.21) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08 
N 56,194 56,194 56,194 56,194 56,194 56,194 56,194 56,194 56,194 56,194 
 
Good 31.11** -16.11 6.01 11.45 14.60 33.29*** 17.96** 23.38*** 10.37+ 4.09 
Faith (11.48) (33.09) (19.14) (17.80) (10.38) (7.64) (6.51) (6.12) (5.47) (4.56) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.08 
N 55,579 55,579 55,579 55,579 55,579 55,579 55,579 55,579 55,579 55,579 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of weeks of job tenure of private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output from analysis using 
equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the natural logarithm of 
weeks of job tenure of private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for 
the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, demographics, the size of the firm they work in, 
whether they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between individuals’ industry of employment and calendary year-dummies, and between four Census-region dummies and 
calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations 
within states. 
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Table C2 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of Weeks of 
Job Tenure for Nonmanufacturing Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 
Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied -19.32** -23.75* -27.58* -29.94** -17.27** -10.90+ -8.31 -6.03 -5.84 -0.73 
Contract (6.50) (11.63) (10.91) (8.93) (6.23) (5.95) (5.22) (5.66) (4.44) (3.09) 
R-Sq 0.60 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.06 
N 41,723 41,723 41,723 41,723 41,723 41,723 41,723 41,723 41,723 41,723 
 
Public -3.42 -16.97+ -12.26 -0.14 -2.53 -1.02 -1.62 4.02 1.83 3.54 
Policy (4.91) (9.37) (10.89) (6.56) (4.06) (5.51) (4.91) (5.62) (5.78) (4.14) 
R-Sq 0.60 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.06 
N 43,621 43,621 43,621 43,621 43,621 43,621 43,621 43,621 43,621 43,621 
 
Good 46.88** -3.19 17.85 30.01 22.21+ 45.90*** 31.19*** 32.63*** 23.39* 11.93 
Faith (13.94) (32.02) (21.87) (20.13) (12.03) (13.05) (8.46) (8.83) (10.10) (7.50) 
R-Sq 0.60 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.07 
N 43,288 43,288 43,288 43,288 43,288 43,288 43,288 43,288 43,288 43,288 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of weeks of job tenure of private  wage and salary employees in nonmanufacturing industries in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows 
output from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times 
the natural logarithm of weeks of job tenure of private-sector  wage and salary employees in nonmanufacturing industries in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ 
demographics, the size of the firm they work in, whether they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  
Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table C3 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of Weeks of 
Job Tenure for Manufacturing Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 
Preceding Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied 4.80 -31.13* -10.81 -0.80 2.71 9.37 6.11 13.27 14.00+ 9.87+ 
Contract (12.01) (11.66) (16.40) (11.88) (14.45) (11.21) (10.24) (9.35) (8.09) (5.76) 
R-Sq 0.74 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 
N 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 
 
Public 1.25 -11.11 -27.48+ 7.21 18.73* 28.65** 15.64* 13.01 15.17+ -7.50 
Policy (8.79) (21.47) (13.80) (7.46) (9.21) (8.83) (7.20) (7.77) (8.45) (5.32) 
R-Sq 0.75 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 
N 10,986 10,986 10,986 10,986 10,986 10,986 10,986 10,986 10,986 10,986 
 
Good -50.95+ -51.33 -56.54 -65.66* -34.72 -41.04+ -42.01** -33.63+ 24.05 -32.40* 
Faith (28.36) (54.21) (36.18) (27.34) (26.43) (21.11) (13.97) (16.80) (30.97) (14.65) 
R-Sq 0.77 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.08 
N 9,567 9,567 9,567 9,567 9,567 9,567 9,567 9,567 9,567 9,567 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of weeks of job tenure of private-sector  wage and salary employees in manufacturing industry in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows 
output from analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times 
the natural logarithm of weeks of job tenure of private-sector  wage and salary employees in manufacturing industry in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ 
demographics, the size of the firm they work in, whether they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  
Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table C4 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of Weeks of 
Job Tenure for Male Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding 
Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied -0.62 -10.33 -19.52 -9.38 -1.07 0.08 -4.33 -0.97 2.28 -0.45 
Contract (5.68) (14.89) (13.43) (9.72) (7.17) (6.56) (5.06) (5.63) (4.89) (4.55) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 
N 28,903 28,903 28,903 28,903 28,903 28,903 28,903 28,903 28,903 28,903 
 
Public 2.58 -14.86 -7.70 -0.75 -4.05 6.69 10.77 9.70 0.70 -2.07 
Policy (6.25) (13.86) (12.61) (7.25) (5.06) (8.04) (10.04) (8.03) (6.14) (4.50) 
R-Sq 0.58 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.07 
N 30,317 30,317 30,317 30,317 30,317 30,317 30,317 30,317 30,317 30,317 
 
Good 31.46+ -14.80 -14.05 -6.87 -4.61 13.04 19.68* 23.80* 26.40** 12.53+ 
Faith (15.80) (40.54) (17.88) (20.94) (13.36) (13.47) (9.68) (9.50) (7.89) (6.43) 
R-Sq 0.58 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 
N 30,135 30,135 30,135 30,135 30,135 30,135 30,135 30,135 30,135 30,135 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of weeks of job tenure of male private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output from analysis 
using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the natural logarithm 
of weeks of job tenure of male private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data 
set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, the size of the firm they work in, whether 
they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between individuals’ industry of employment and calendary year-dummies, and between four Census-region dummies and calendar 
year dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within 
states. 
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Table C5 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of Weeks of 
Job Tenure for Female Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding 
Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied -26.33*** -31.70* -33.35** -29.70** -20.33** -14.51* -7.79 -2.54 -0.95 10.55** 
Contract (7.02) (13.92) (11.93) (9.90) (6.14) (6.20) (4.66) (6.66) (3.21) (3.80) 
R-Sq 0.60 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.07 
N 25,099 25,099 25,099 25,099 25,099 25,099 25,099 25,099 25,099 25,099 
 
Public -5.31 -19.08 -20.12 -3.02 -2.89 1.22 -2.06 -3.19 4.48 7.12 
Policy (6.77) (13.37) (12.73) (9.72) (6.50) (8.23) (6.64) (6.28) (4.60) (5.06) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08 
N 26,178 26,178 26,178 26,178 26,178 26,178 26,178 26,178 26,178 26,178 
 
Good 28.53 -19.14 54.54 32.36 37.99 51.36* 16.89+ 18.97* -9.13 -11.45 
Faith (22.06) (39.68) (32.77) (28.21) (22.81) (20.43) (9.09) (7.84) (11.58) (8.53) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08 
N 25,701 25,701 25,701 25,701 25,701 25,701 25,701 25,701 25,701 25,701 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of weeks of job tenure of female private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output from analysis 
using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the natural logarithm 
of weeks of job tenure of female private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data 
set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, the size of the firm they work in, whether 
they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between individuals’ industry of employment and calendary year-dummies, and between four Census-region dummies and calendar 
year dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within 
states. 
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Table C6 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of Weeks of 
Job Tenure for White Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding 
Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied -16.00* -27.75* -37.7*** -30.14** -17.99** -10.91* -8.76 -5.49 0.08 6.66 
Contract (6.24) (11.70) (10.53) (9.47) (6.40) (4.80) (5.64) (6.13) (5.51) (4.75) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 
N 30,723 30,723 30,723 30,723 30,723 30,723 30,723 30,723 30,723 30,723 
 
Public -0.50 -17.96 -6.61 2.67 3.73 3.08 3.26 3.21 -1.39 1.30 
Policy (6.21) (12.97) (11.20) (9.28) (6.80) (11.45) (9.03) (5.75) (4.32) (3.51) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 
N 32,731 32,731 32,731 32,731 32,731 32,731 32,731 32,731 32,731 32,731 
 
Good 29.19* -16.15 5.42 12.82 13.83 21.81 20.74* 20.31* 12.71 -0.60 
Faith (13.30) (32.97) (26.03) (23.63) (19.20) (14.04) (10.13) (10.06) (7.85) (5.34) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 
N 31,417 31,417 31,417 31,417 31,417 31,417 31,417 31,417 31,417 31,417 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of weeks of job tenure of white private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output from analysis 
using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the natural logarithm 
of weeks of job tenure of white private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data 
set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, the size of the firm they work in, whether 
they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between individuals’ industry of employment and calendary year-dummies, and between four Census-region dummies and calendar 
year dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within 
states. 
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Table C7 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Distribution of Weeks of 
Job Tenure for Nonwhite Workers:  Contrasting Outcomes in Years 2 and 3 Following Adoption with Years 1 and 2 Preceding 
Adoption, 1979-2014 
 OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.20) Q(0.30) Q(0.40) Q(0.50) Q(0.60) Q(0.70) Q(0.80) Q(0.90) 
Implied -0.59 -14.41 -11.98 -6.93 0.97 2.10 1.71 3.53 4.41 -2.93 
Contract (4.84) (16.72) (11.63) (6.31) (4.23) (5.07) (5.29) (3.99) (6.42) (6.27) 
R-Sq 0.58 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 
N 23,279 23,279 23,279 23,279 23,279 23,279 23,279 23,279 23,279 23,279 
 
Public -1.95 -21.51 -13.37 -5.57 -9.32 0.10 0.95 10.60 13.71* 9.98 
Policy (7.91) (12.95) (14.33) (13.00) (10.01) (11.96) (8.85) (7.00) (6.29) (6.10) 
R-Sq 0.57 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.07 
N 23,764 23,764 23,764 23,764 23,764 23,764 23,764 23,764 23,764 23,764 
 
Good 23.14 -45.10 -6.93 43.84* 8.77 28.79+ 4.60 5.51 2.48 10.33 
Faith (17.75) (37.05) (21.40) (19.24) (17.23) (17.05) (11.01) (9.21) (3.76) (8.13) 
R-Sq 0.59 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.07 
N 21,864 21,864 21,864 21,864 21,864 21,864 21,864 21,864 21,864 21,864 
Note:  Each entry in column 1 shows output from analysis using equation 1, which is a weighted OLS fixed effects difference and differences regression in which the dependent variable is 
100 times the natural logarthim of weeks of job tenure of nonwhite private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  Each entry in columns 2 through 9 shows output from 
analysis using equation 2, which is a a difference in differences unconditional quantile regression in which the dependent variable is a recentered influence function of 100 times the natural 
logarithm of weeks of job tenure of nonwhite private-sector  wage and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, the size of the firm they 
work in, whether they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between individuals’ industry of employment and calendary year-dummies, and between four Census-region 
dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across 
observations within states. 
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Table C8 --- Difference in Differences Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on Average Weeks of Job 
Tenure:  Dynamic Effects from 2 Years 2 Preceding Adoption to 3 Years Following Adoption, 1979-2014 
 
Implied                    Public      Good 
Contract OLS  Policy OLS  Faith OLS 
IC t-2 6.87  PP t-2 -4.54  GF t-2 -5.39 
 (4.19)   (5.02)   (15.74) 
IC t-1 -0.83  PP t-1 11.29**  GF t-1 1.89 
 (6.21)   (4.05)   (12.65) 
IC -8.15  PP 12.50*  GF -3.72 
 (5.67)   (5.57)   (12.70) 
IC t+1 -8.46  PP t+1 8.62  GF t+1 13.89 
 (7.02)   (5.85)   (12.49) 
IC t+2 -10.22  PP t+2 3.87  GF t+2 28.21* 
 (6.19)   (6.11)   (10.67) 
IC Lag t+3 -9.25  PP Lag t+3 6.76  GF Lag t+3 10.62 
 (6.26)   (4.84)   (10.78) 
R-Sq    0.53    
N    10,8873    
Note:  Each entry  shows output of analysis using equation 3, a weighted OLS baseline difference and differences regression with two years of leads and lags in which all yearly coefficients, 
ηm, are evaluated relative to year t-3, just prior to the first pre-period year evaluated.  The dependent variable is 100 times the natural logarithm of weeks of job tenure of private-sector  wage 
and salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include 
state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, demographics, the size of the firm they work in, whether they ever change state of residence, 
as well as interactions between individuals’ industry of employment and calendary year-dummies, and between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are 
weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Figure C1 --- Dynamic Effects of Wrongful Discharge Law Adoption on Weeks of Job Tenure in the Private sector: 1979-2014 
 
Note:  The figure shows dynamic effects of wrongful discharge laws on wages using equation 3, which is a weighted OLS baseline difference and differences regression with two years of leads and lags in which all 
yearly coefficients, ηm, are evaluated relative to year t-3, just prior to the first pre-period year evaluated.  The dependent variable is 100 times the natural logarithm of weeks of job tenure of private-sector  wage and 
salary employees  in 50 U.S. states.  The weeks of job tenure are taken from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All models include state main effects and indicators 
for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, demographics, the size of the firm they work in, whether they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between individuals’ industry of 
employment and calendary year-dummies, and between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to 
allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table C9 --- Estimates of the Average Marginal Effect of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Probability Workers Are 
Employed for Three or More Years, Using Observations Over All Years Policies Are In Place, 1979-2014 
 
 Total Nonmanufacturing 
Implied Contract -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Public Policy 0.04** 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Good Faith 0.07* 0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.17 0.17 
N 108,873 89,832 
Note:  Each entry in columns 1 and 2 shows output from analysis  and in nonmanfuacturing industries, respectively, using equation 4, which is a difference and differences probit model, in 
which the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether private-sector  wage and salary employees of each sector in 50 U.S. states are employed in their jobs for three or more years. 
The dichotomous dependent variable is constructed from the weeks of job tenure data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014 by assigning 
a zero value to individuals when their weeks of tenure are below 156.43 weeks, the equivalent of three years, and a value of one to inviduals when their weeks of tenure equal or exceed 
156.43 weeks.  All models include state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for individuals’ industry, demographics, the size of the firm they work in, whether 
they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar year dummies, although output in column 2 drop industry controls, by necesity.  
Models are weighted using NLSY79 sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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Table C10 --- Estimates of the Average Marginal Effect of Wrongful Discharge Laws on the Probability of On-the-Job 
Training Participation and Intensity by Economic Sector and Demographic Group, 1979-2014 
 
Panel A.  Worker Receives On-The-Job Training 
 
 Total Manufacturing Nonmanufact. Male Female White Nonwhite 
Implied Contract -0.00 0.07* -0.02+ 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
Public Policy 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Good Faith 0.05+ -0.01 0.05+ 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.14 
N 108,505 18,203 89,543 57,459 51,379 62,003 46,835 
 
Panel B.  On-The-Job Training Requires Time Commitment of At Least 40 Hours per Week  
 
 Total Manufacturing Nonmanufact. Male Female White Nonwhite 
Implied Contract -0.07 0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 N/A 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) N/A 
Public Policy 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 N/A 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) N/A 
Good Faith 0.20* 0.17 0.29*** -0.06 0.32** 0.19* N/A 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) N/A 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 N/A 
N 11,108 1,828 9,201 5,823 5,301 6,985 N/A 
Note:  Each entry in columns 1 through 7 in Panels A and B shows output from analysis by economic sector and demgraphic group subsamples of private-sector  wage and salary workers in 
50 U.S. states using equation 4, which is a difference and differences probit model, in which the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates, in Panel A, whether a worker receives any on-
the-job training (i.e. apprenticeship, or worksite training performed by the employer or an outside entity chosen by the employer), or, in Panel B, whether a worker is enrolled in on-the-job 
training (i.e . apprenticeship, or worksite training performed by the employer or an outside entity chosen by the employer) which requires a time commitment of at lesat 40 hours per week.  
The former dependent variables is pulled directly, and the latter is constructed from a variable for usual hours per week of training using 40 hours as a threshold for the dummy, from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 panel data set for the years 1979 to 2014.  All output in column 1 includes state main effects and indicators for each year in the sample, indicators for 
individuals’ industry, demographics, the size of the firm they work in, whether they ever change state of residence, as well as interactions between four Census-region dummies and calendar 
year dummies, although output in columns 2 and 3 drop industry controls and output in columns 4 through 7 drop demographic controls, by necesity.  Models are weighted using NLSY79 
sample weights.  Huber-White robust standard errors are used to allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
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